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V""EREMONIAL Marriage. At its 1987 regular session, the Texas Leg-I islature enacted a number of amendments to the Texas Family Code
relating to the process of obtaining a license to marry. First, in order
to dispose of the problem pointed out in a recent Attorney General's opin-
ion,' the legislature amended sections 1.02,2 1.05, 3 and 1.514 of the Family
Code to enable a person under eighteen whose prior marriage has been dis-
solved to marry without parental consent. Second, the legislature further
amended sections 1.025 and 1.056 by deleting references to the medical ex-
amination requirements, repealed in 1985.7 Third, the legislature amended
sections 1.03,8 1.059 and 1.9210 to conform with section 2.21(a)(4)," which
prohibits a person from marrying an aunt or uncle. Fourth, the legislature
repealed the portion of section 1.5212 that required the parent consenting to
the marriage of a child under eighteen to accompany the child when apply-
ing for a marriage license. Now, the parent instead may give consent at any
time within thirty days of the child's application for the marriage license.' 3
Fifth, the legislature amended section 1.82 to require three days to elapse
between the granting of the license and a ceremonial marriage.' 4 Section
1.82 provides an exception to this requirement if one of the applicants either
serves in the armed forces or obtains a court order allowing an earlier mar-
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Blake Berryman and David White in the preparation of this article.
1. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-359 (1986).
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
3. Id. § 1.05.
4. Id. § 1.51.
5. Id. § 1.02.
6. Id. § 1.05.
7. Act of April 11, 1985, ch. 32, §§ 1, 2, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 407, 408. The three
elements of an informal marriage are (1) the parties must agree to be married; (2) after the
agreement, the parties must live together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) represent to
others that they are married.
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
9. Id. § 1.05.
10. Id. § 1.92.
11. Id. § 2.21(a)(4).
12. Id. § 1.52, amended by Act of 1987, ch. 43, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1.52
(Vernon).
13. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.52(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
14. Id. § 1.82.
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riage ceremony.15 The legislature added a new section 2.48, which makes a
formal marriage performed in violation of section 1.82's three-days require-
ment voidable.16 The legislature thus expressed its willingness to require a
"cooling-off period" between the time of licensing and the celebration of
marriage. By oversight, however, the legislature failed to prescribe a short
time period within which the parties could bring an annulment proceeding if
they did not comply with the cooling-off period. Sixth, the legislature
amended section 1.83 to allow retired judges with only twelve, rather than
fifteen, years of prior judicial service to perform marriage ceremonies. 1 7
Informal Marriage. In In re Estate of Giessel 18 evidence was offered to show
that a couple, who had lived together for twenty years prior to the man's
death, had satisfied all three elements of an informal marriage.19 The con-
testants of the marriage, however, introduced evidence showing that, during
the period that the couple lived together, the man and the woman each exe-
cuted at least one formal instrument reciting that he or she was single. The
contestants also introduced evidence of the deceased husband's prior state-
ments20 indicating that he was not married and evidence that the man and
the woman each filed federal income tax returns as a single person. On the
basis of other evidence, however, the jury nevertheless concluded that the
couple had been married, and the appellate court found that the trial court
committed no error.2'
In Bolash v. Heid,22 another informal marriage case, the result turned on
when the informal marriage commenced. All public representations of the
marriage occurred after the purchase of particular realty, the disposition of
which was at issue in a divorce suit brought by the woman against the man.
Although the appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
the couple had entered into an informal marriage, the appellate court con-
cluded that the evidence failed to establish that the parties held the woman
out to the public as a wife prior to the man's acquisition of the property. 23
Thus, the property could not have been the spouses' community property,
and consequently it was not subject to division upon divorce. 24 In an obiter
dictum, however, the appellate court rejected the man's further argument
that his subsequent formal marriage to another woman raised a presumption
15. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.82 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
16. Id. § 2.48.
17. Id. § 1.83.
18. 734 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975); see also Cain v. Whitlock, 741
S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). An agreement to cohabit
at present and to marry in the future does not satisfy the statutory test. Leal v. Moreno, 733
S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
20. TEX. R. EvID. 601(b), the "Dead Man's Statute," does not bar the admission of state-
ments made by a deceased person in order to prove the existence of an informal marriage.
Cain v. Whitlock, 741 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
21. Giessel, 734 S.W.2d at 32.
22. 733 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
23. Id. at 699.
24. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1975).
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against the validity of the prior alleged marriage. 25 The court pointed out
that the only purpose of such a presumption is to preserve the validity of the
subsequent marriage, which, in this case, the parties did not attack.26
Equal Protection. The draftsmen of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution27 probably did not in-
tend to invalidate the principle of unity of spouses, which then prevailed in
most of the states, or to give married or single women full citizenship status.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court waited until 1981 to condemn as
unconstitutional a Louisiana husband's status as sole manager of the entire
community estate and thus of his wife's interest in any community property
without the wife's consent.28 As recently as 1966, the Supreme Court re-
fused to invalidate the principle that Texas married women lacked general
contractual capacity.29 In his opinion for the Court in United States v.
Yazell 30 Justice Fortas ringingly affirmed the federal policy of not encroach-
ing on a state's handling of essentially familial legal matters.3 1
Marital property law reformers from the 1950s through the 1970s sought
a right for Texas married women to manage their separate property without
their husband's interference. Married women attained full contractual ca-
pacity in 1963 when the legislature repealed article 1299,32 which required a
husband's consent to his wife's transfer of her separate land and securities.
The legislature waited until 1967, however, to repeal articles 6605 and 6608,
which required, respectively, the husband's acknowledgement and the wife's
privy acknowledgement for recordation of conveyances of the wife's separate
land and the couple's homestead. 33 Now, at very long last, a Texas wife has
successfully attacked the constitutionality of a requirement that a husband
join his wife's conveyance of her separate property.34 In Wessely Energy
Corp. v. Jennings35 the Supreme Court of Texas held former article 1299
unconstitutional 36 under both the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution37 and article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. 38
The Texas Supreme Court thus fully vindicated a 1954 conveyance by a
25. Bolash, 733 S.W.2d at 699.
26. Id.; see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30
Sw. L.J. 68, 70 (1976).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
28. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
29. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 352; see also McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21
Sw. L.J. 39, 46 (1967) (discusses Yazell).
32. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1299 (Vernon 1925), repealed by Act of May 24,
1963, ch. 473, § 1, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1188, 1189.
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 6605, 6608 (Vernon 1925), repealed by Act of May
27, 1967, ch. 309, § 6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 741.
34. Wessely Energy Corp. v. Jennings, 736 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1987).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 627, 629.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
38. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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Texas married woman without her husband's joinder.39 In a pusillanimous
postscript, however, the court stated that its conclusion only applied pro-
spectively. 4° The court's decision, therefore, does not affect any other title
taken under former article 1299.41
Spousal Agency. The draftsmen of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967
perceived no need to address the issue of spousal agency statutorily except in
cases of liability for necessaries. Nevertheless, a growing number of mis-
informed judicial conclusions, holding one spouse liable for debts contracted
solely by the other spouse,42 underscored the need for legislative strictures.
The legislature therefore enacted a provision 43 that reiterates the long-stand-
ing rule that "the marital relationship does not in itself make one spouse the
agent of the other." 44 Hence, an obligation incurred by one spouse during
the marriage does not produce liability as to the other spouse unless the
spouse who incurs the obligation acts as the agent of the other spouse.45 By
enacting this provision, 46 the legislature did not purport to change existing
law in any way, but merely to clarify what they had previously regarded as
virtually self-evident. 47 No one knows just how some members of the bench
and bar developed the misconception that a spouse who was not a party to a
contract could incur liability for it, unless the contract involved the acquisi-
tion of necessaries. Ordinarily a court terms a debt incurred by a spouse a
community debt for the purpose of characterizing property bought on credit
or with borrowed money.48 With that description, however, a court does
not thereby impute liability to the noncontracting spouse.49 To dispose of
misapprehensions concerning limits to the concept of community debt, the
legislature enacted section 4.031(b)50 with a cross-reference in section
5.61(b) 51 to make the point doubly clear.
39. Wessely, 736 S.W.2d at 629.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Dan Lawson & Assocs. v. Miller, 742 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ); Wileman v. Wade, 665 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ);
Anderson v. Royce, 624 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Brazosport Bank v. Robertson, 616 S.W.2d 3 3, 366-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Inwood Nat'l Bank v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
44. Wilkinson v. Stevison, 514 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex. 1974); see Gravis v. Physicians &
Surgeons Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968); Coats v. Bockstein, 176 S.W.2d 968, 970-71
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ); Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 254 S.W. 595,
598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808
(1925).
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
46. Id. § 4.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
47. See Tindall, Proposed Legislation in Family Law, 49 TEX. B.J. 1175, 1179 (1986).
48. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1937).
49. In re Karber, 25 Bankr. 9, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); Latimer v. City Nat'l Bank,
715 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ); Miller v. City Nat'l Bank, 594 S.W.2d
823, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
50. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). This provision, however,
contains an ambiguity as to which spouse it refers and needs clarification.
51. Id. § 5.61(b).
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Alienation of Affection. In 1975 the legislature abolished the tort of criminal
conversation, a civil action against a third person for having sexual inter-
course with the plaintiff's spouse.52 At the 1987 regular session, the legisla-
ture went further by abolishing the broader tort of alienation of affection,
which consisted of undermining the affection that the other spouse held to-
ward the aggrieved spouse either by enticing the other spouse away from the
aggrieved spouse or by other means. 53 The repeal's proponents argued that
the other spouse ought to be able to make such choices without thereby
giving the complaining spouse a cause of action. Thus, a third person, with
impunity, may seek one spouse's breach of the marital contract of fidelity,
though the defaulting spouse may pay through the unequal division of com-
munity property upon divorce. 54
Loss of Consortium. Texas law clearly allows either spouse to recover for
loss of companionship with the other spouse.55 Texas law considers a
couple's estrangement and contemplated divorce relevant to the determina-
tion of such a loss. 5 6 In Perez v. United States57 a federal trial court had
rejected a husband's loss-of-consortium claim because his wife had sued for
divorce at the time of the trial.58 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant's wrongful
act did not cause a loss of consortium. 59
Spousal Testimony. With the adoption of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evi-
dence in 1985, Texas rejected the traditional rule that one spouse could not
testify against the other spouse in a criminal prosecution, except in some
specific instances in which the other spouse could come forward voluntarily
to protect his or her own interests.6° The federal common law rule has fa-
vored voluntary spousal testimony for some time.6 1 The federal interception
statute62 addresses a somewhat different question: the right of a spouse to
suppress any evidence gained by the other through unauthorized electronic
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05, approved by Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 637, § 1, 1975
Tex. Gen. Laws 1942.
53. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06, amended by Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 453, § 1, 1987
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4042 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
54. See Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. 1980). The tort of impairment of
familial relationship, however, apparently still subsists. See Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Bag-
gage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. 1987).
55. See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978).
56. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1986).
57. 830 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1987).
58. Id. at 59-60.
59. Id.
60. TEX. R. CRiM. EvID. 504(2)(a) (supplanting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
38.11 (Vernon 1979)); see Willard v. State, 719 S.W.2d 595, 600-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en
banc) (decided under old rule). For significant recent developments in this and related mat-
ters, see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw.
L.J. 131, 133 (1984) [hereinafter McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey]; McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 65, 66 (1983).
61. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw.
L.J. 93, 95 (1981) [hereinafter McKnight, 1981 Annual Survey].
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
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listening devices. 63 In Kotria v. Kotrla,64 a divorce case, the court held that
the husband's tape-recorded evidence of a conversation between him and his
wife was not inadmissible under the Texas interception statute. 65
"The rule" is a courtroom procedure that prevents witnesses from hearing
the testimony of other witnesses. 66 Texas courts traditionally have exempted
parties' spouses from the rule when litigation involves the community prop-
erty interests of both spouses, even when both spouses are not joined for-
mally as parties to the litigation.67 The new Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
267 expressly excludes a party's spouse from the rule, irrespective of whether
a community interest is directly at stake.68
Interspousal Immunity. In Price v. Price69 the Supreme Court of Texas an-
nounced what many members of the legal community had suspected for
some time: the Texas doctrine of interspousal immunity has expired.70 The
case before the court involved a premarital tort. A motorcycle passenger
brought suit for her injury against the motorcycle driver, her husband at the
time of the suit but not as of the time of the motorcycle accident. Although
a spouse probably would not maintain such a suit against his or her spouse,
except for the purpose of recovering from the tortfeasor's insurer, the court
held that a spouse may sue his or her spouse. 7 1 The decision's irony is that
insurance companies in all likelihood will exclude coverage for interspousal
liability under future policies of insurance. 72
In choice-of-law cases, however, courts still may apply the spousal immu-
nity doctrine. In Robertson v. Estate of McKnight 73 the Texas Supreme
Court concluded that with respect to an action brought by a deceased New
Mexican wife's estate against her husband's estate for a cause of action that
occurred in Texas, a Texas court would apply the law of New Mexico, the
marital domicile, under the most-significant-contacts doctrine. 74 The court,
63. Id.; see Nations v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1987); McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 107 (1977).
64. 718 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Id. at 855; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 123.002 (Vernon 1986).
66. See Bishop v. Wollyung, 705 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
67. See Southern Ice & Utils. Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex. 82, 85, 95 S.W.2d 956, 958
(1936); Bishop, 705 S.W.2d at 314; Martin v. Burcham, 203 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1947, no writ).
68. TEX. R. Civ. P. 267(b)(1) (effective January 1, 1988); see TEX. R. EviD. 614(1) (paral-
lel language). But see TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 613 (does not explicitly exempt parties' spouses
from rule).
69. 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).
70. Id. at 320. Though the injured passenger had also sued the driver and owner of the
truck with which the cycle collided, those defendants settled their dispute with the plaintiff
prior to trial.
71. Id. at 319. A person would more likely otherwise maintain a suit against his or her
spouse if the marriage has been or is about to be dissolved.
72. See id. at 320 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
73. 609 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Tex. 1980); see also McKnight, 1981 Annual Survey, supra
note 61, at 96-97 (discusses Robertson).
74. Robertson, 609 S.W.2d at 536; see also Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.
1979) (discusses most-significant-contacts doctrine).
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therefore, did not apply the spousal immunity doctrine. 7 1 In Mills v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.7 6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Oklahoma law should control application of the princi-
ple of interspousal immunity in a suit brought in tort by an ex-wife against
her former husband. 7 7 The tort occurred in Texas, where the parties then
lived. The parties later moved to Kansas and then to Oklahoma, where they
obtained a divorce. When the ex-wife filed suit in an Oklahoma federal
court, she lived in Oklahoma and the ex-husband lived in Kansas. Observ-
ing the principle that a federal court deciding a diversity case must apply the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which the court is located, 78 the Tenth
Circuit applied the Oklahoma conflict-of-laws rule, the "most significant re-
lationship" rule.79 The court concluded that Oklahoma maintained a closer
relationship with the married couple than did either Texas or Kansas.80
Consequently, the court applied Oklahoma domestic law and therefore did
not apply the doctrine of spousal immunity.8 I The court clearly was hostile
to the interspousal immunity doctrine, which had faltered, but still seem-
ingly subsisted in both Texas and Kansas when the cause of action
accrued.82
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
Premarital Agreements. Appellate courts dealt with two cases involving pre-
marital agreements, each with rather unusual provisions. In Bradley v.
Bradley 8 3 the court considered a written agreement entered into by a couple
shortly before their marriage in 1982. The couple agreed to do any and all
things necessary in order to establish or preserve the separate character of all
revenues, increases, and income from "separate property, and from their re-
spective personal efforts .... ,,84 The agreement went on to provide specifi-
cally that in April of each year the spouses would make a partition in writing
of all of the community estate accumulated during the prior calendar year.
75. Robertson, 609 S.W.2d at 537.
76. 827 F.2d 1418 (10th Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 1422.
78. Id. at 1420.
79. Id. at 1421.
80. Id. The court explained:
[Tihe marital domicile moved through three different states and never had an
extended life in any of those three. Thus, the immunity question cannot be an-
swered by looking simply at the law of the parties' domicile. Instead, the rela-
tionship that each state has to the parties' marriage must be evaluated in light of
the purpose of each state's laws.
Id. By any balanced analysis of the facts, however, Texas maintained the most significant
relationship to the cause of action. The decision's result under Texas law, however, would
have remained the same.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1420-22. The Tenth Circuit stated that the Price decision, which held that the
doctrine of spousal immunity no longer constituted good law in Texas, established new "legis-
lation." Id. The Tenth Circuit therefore seemed to be hesitant to follow Price. See id. at 1420
n.2. Price, however, merely declared the existing state of the law. Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d
316, 320 (Tex. 1987).
83. 725 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
84. Id. at 504.
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The agreement further provided that the couple's failure to partition com-
munity property would not constitute a waiver of rights under the agree-
ment. The form of the couple's agreement typified premarital agreements
prior to the 1980 amendment of article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Consti-
tution,8 5 which allows future spouses to make a present written partition of
future acquisitions that would otherwise constitute community property.
Although no appellate court had interpreted such terms of a pre-1980 agree-
ment, many members of the legal community thought that courts would not
enforce such executory provisions of pre-1980 agreements.
In Bradley the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the agreement
did not constitute a partition and therefore failed in its purpose.8 6 The in-
strument merely constituted an agreement to partition community acquisi-
tions.87 One wonders why the draftsman of the agreement did not choose to
utilize the new means offered by the 1980 constitutional amendment. Hav-
ing chosen the particular form of agreement, the draftsman might have an-
ticipated the court's conclusion. The proponent of the agreement apparently
did not argue that equity should treat as done what the couple agreed to be
done. Although the pre-1980 law probably foreclosed such an equitable ap-
proach, if a party pleads the proper predicate, a court might order specific
performance of a post-1980 unperformed agreement of this sort or treat such
an agreement as performed in equity in accordance with its terms.
A more unusual written premarital agreement came before the court in
Hibbler v. Knight.88 In the agreement the husband-to-be agreed that his fu-
ture wife's earnings during marriage would be her separate property and
then declared that his future wife would be entitled to his estate, provided
that the couple were neither separated nor divorced at the time of his death.
The prospective husband evidently meant to make both of these provisions
for his wife without exacting any benefits for himself. The agreement made
no suggestion of a partition or an exchange. Because the instrument made
no gift of present interest and contained no partition of a present or future
community interest, the widow argued that the instrument constituted either
a will or a contract to make a will. As a contract to make a will, the writing
clearly failed8 9 under the 1979 amendment to section 59A of the Probate
Code, which requires that an executory contract to make a will be affirmed
and summarized in an instrument constituting a will. 90 As a will, the instru-
ment failed because it lacked the testamentary formalities of execution and
was not holographic. 9 1
The widow asserted alternatively that the object of the declaration could
be achieved if the court treated it as a "nontestamentary" agreement under
85. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
86. Bradley, 725 S.W.2d at 504.
87. Id.
88. 735 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 926.
90. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980).
91. Hibbler, 735 S.W.2d at 927.
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section 450 of the Probate Code, enacted in 1979.92 Section 450 refers to
various instruments that take effect at death not as wills, but as contracts or
gifts and provides that such instruments are effective at death notwithstand-
ing lack of testamentary formality.93 A court simply carries out the instru-
ment according to the decedent's directions for the disposition of his
property.94 The literal terms of section 450 clearly covered the writing
before the court in Hibbler. Although the court might have construed the
instrument as a will, the court held that the agreement merely stood as an
instrument providing for a gift to take effect at death. 9 5 By contrast, a recip-
rocal will also constitutes a contract, but its contractual characteristics are
secondary to its testamentary ones. Without making a thorough analysis of
the nature and scope of section 450, the court held that the legislature,
through its enactment of section 450, did not intend to give testamentary
effect to an agreement that takes effect at death; such treatment would cause
a contracting party's entire estate to pass without compliance with the for-
malities required of a will.9
6
Survivorship to Community Property. The court in Hibbler thus refused to
construe section 450 as superceding the requirements of testamentary for-
malities with which a donor must comply for a gift to take effect at death.97
Section 450, however, remains one of several provisions adopted over the
years to simplify the process of succession. 98 The constitutional amendment
approved by Texas voters in November 1987 is the latest provision of that
type.99 The amendment permits spouses to provide in writing that their
community property will pass to the survivor.1°° The amendment does not
obviate the need for a will, however, unless the spouses desire only this par-
ticular result.
92. Section 450(a) provides:
(a) [T]he following provisions in an insurance policy .... deposit agreement, ....
conveyance of real estate or personal property, or any other written instrument
effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust [are] deemed to be nontesta-
mentary, and this code does not invalidate the instrument or any provision
(3) that any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a per-
son designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
93. Id. § 450(a)(l).
94. Id. § 450(a)(3).
95. Hibbler, 735 S.W.2d at 927.
96. Id. This sort of reasoning is perverse.
97. Id
98. See, e.g., Law of Jan. 28, 1840, § 1, 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 167, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 341 (1898) (enactment of concept of holographic will now embodied in TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980)); Act of Apr. 4, 1955, ch. 55, § 59, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88,
107-08 (introduction of self-proving affidavit to shift burden of proof with respect to testamen-
tary capacity).
99. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
100. Id. "Spouses may agree on writing that all or part of their community property be-
comes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of a spouse." Id.; see McKnight,




The Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas formulated this provi-
sion because Texas couples seem to want and need this sort of device. Since
the mid-1940s Texas couples have used the joint tenancy with right of survi-
vorship but found it wanting in several respects. First, the Texas Supreme
Court imposed standards relating to the tenancy's creation, which evidently
were not understood and which banks and other intermediaries seemed inca-
pable of meeting.' 0 1 Second, even if those standards were met, the created
tenancy possessed certain undesirable characteristics. If spouses created the
tenancy by a partition of community property followed by a recombination
of the separate property produced by the partition, the joint tenancy became,
by force of circumstances, a species of separate property with the following
shortcomings: such property is not divisible on divorce, ' 0 2 it cannot be con-
verted back into community property, 10 3 and its status is uncertain with re-
spect to the discharge of spousal liabilities. 104 An agreement for
survivorship in community property avoids all these shortcomings of the
joint tenancy.
The new constitutional amendment underscores the immense and contin-
uing need to distinguish between the joint tenancy with a right of survivor-
ship and community property with a right of survivorship. If banks and
their customer-spouses continue to use the old device and the forms con-
cocted for its creation for the purpose of creating a right of survivorship in
community property, the depositors may not achieve their objective. Com-
pliance with the constitutional authority, however, is both easy and certain.
The spouses need only join in a written agreement by which they give each
other the right of survivorship with respect to all or a particular part of their
community property. This sort of right of survivorship, however, applies
only to community property. The joint tenancy remains a useful device in
relation to separate property interests.
The premarital instrument by which the husband-to-be purported to dis-
pose of all of his property at death in Hibbler v. Knight 15 provides a useful
illustration. If the instrument in Hibbler were executed today, the terms of
the 1987 constitutional amendment would not affect it for two reasons.
First, the parties to the Hibbler instrument were not spouses but prospective
spouses.' 0 6 Second, even if the parties had been spouses, they did not pur-
port to create a right of survivorship to their community property in each
101. See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402
S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 574, 342 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1961);
Tuttle v. Simpson, 735 S.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ); Allard v.
Frech, 735 S.W.2d 311, 316 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ granted); McKnight, Family
Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1986) [hereinafter
McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey].
102. See McKnight, The Constitutional Redefinition of Texas Matrimonial Property As It
Affects Antenuptial and Interspousal Transactions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449, 459-61 (1982).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 473.
105. 735 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see
supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
106. Hibbler, 735 S.W.2d at 926.
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other. 107 In Hibbler the prospective husband alone, though joined by his
bride-to-be in executing the instrument, sought to make his prospective wife
the taker at death of all of his property, community or separate.108 Thus,
the provision purported to cover separate as well as community property
interests, but it was not reciprocal. The court, therefore, could not construe
the provisions as a partition or exchange as the law then stood. For the
unilateral purpose for which the instrument in Hibbler was executed, the
constitutional amendment provides no better solution. The amendment also
gives spouses the right to make each other the taker of all or a specified part
of the community estate when one of them dies. 109 If only one of them
wishes to dispose of his or her property at death, some other device must be
used.
Some other qualities of this constitutional power require mention. Both
spouses must join in making the written instrument in order to create a right
of survivorship in community property."l 0 Since the spouses have entered
into a binding contract, arguably neither spouse may withdraw from it uni-
laterally, either orally or in writing."' Because, however, the maker of a
contractual will with terms of mutual survivorship may withdraw from the
contract by giving timely notice to the other party," 12 a similar handling of
the spousal community-survivorship agreements would be appropriate. Dis-
sipation of the agreement's subject matter would have the same effect. If the
community property subject to the right of survivorship is a deposit in a
particular account and is so identified by the instrument creating the right of
survivorship, the right of survivorship will subsist only as long as the funds
in, or added to, the account are still in the account when one of them dies.
The terms of the instrument should not apply to funds removed in the
meantime, though traceable to other assets, unless the spouses specifically so
provide.
The provision for survivorship to community property does not interfere
with the division of such property on divorce. Division upon divorce de-
stroys the community character of property along with the right of survivor-
ship. Similarly, if the property remains undivided upon divorce, the
property becomes a tenancy in common, thereby destroying the right of sur-
vivorship. As long as the marriage subsists, however, and the property sub-
ject to the right of survivorship remains intact, the property remains
community property with a right of survivorship until the couple terminates
their spousal agreement. If the courts allow a timely unilateral withdrawal
from the agreement, either spouse's filing of a petition for divorce or annul-
ment, or a permanent separation of the spouses, should constitute notice. To
avoid uncertainty, couples entering into such agreements should provide, as
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see supra note 100.
110. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
111. But see Annotation, Antenuptual Contracts: Parties' Behavior During Marriage as
Abandonment, Estoppel, or Waiver Regarding Contract Rights, 56 A.L.R.4th 998, 1014 (1987).
112. 2 E. BAILEY, TEXAS LAW OF WILLS 170 (1968).
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the instrument in Hibbler provided, 1 3 that the right of survivorship be-
comes inoperative if one spouse sues for divorce or if the parties separate and
are living apart from each other at the time one spouse dies.
The proposal of a constitutional amendment customarily spawns correla-
tive legislation. The Texas Legislature enacted various provisions at the
1987 regular session to become effective when and if Texas voters should
ratify the community-survivorship amendment in the November election. "14
The legislature decided not to enact a proposed addition to the Family Code
that would have reflected the terms of the prospective amendment, but chose
merely to add a new subsection to Probate Code section 46, which relates to
joint tenancies." 15 The legislature awkwardly included this provision under
the section heading "Joint Tenancies," rather than "Right of Survivor-
ship." 116 No misunderstanding should result, however, because the lan-
guage of section 46(b) deals with spousal agreements concerning community
property, 117 whereas section 46(a) deals with joint tenancies,"18 which can-
not be created out of community property.
The derogation from the constitutional grant of spousal power in subsec-
tion 46(b) raises a more serious problem."19 As enacted, the provision ex-
tends only to "community property which is titled or held with indicia of
title." 20 Thus, the statute covers interests in land held by formal title, in-
cluding automobiles, airplanes, boats, earth-movers, securities, and bank ac-
counts if they are "titled." The statute excludes from coverage lands
acquired by adverse possession without color of title, household furnishings,
securities held in a broker's name, jewels, and cash. Although article XVI,
section 15 of the Texas Constitution gives the legislature power to make
supplementary rules with respect to community property,12' the legislature
lacks the power to restrict constitutional rights. The legislature purportedly
diminished the constitutional power of spouses to provide a written agree-
ment of survivorship to any or all of their community property in existence
when a spouse dies.' 22 The limiting effect of this statutory provision, there-
fore, does not operate effectively.
A spousal agreement that designates the survivor to take the community
share of the first to die forms a mutual designation of heirship. Thus, the
survivor will hold the entire community estate, or a defined part of it, as
113. Hibbler v. Knight, 735 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
114. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 678, §§ 2-3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5063 (Vernon).
115. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides:
(b) Spouses may agree in writing that all or part of their community property
which is titled or held with indicia of title becomes the property of the surviving
spouse on the death of a spouse.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 46(a).
119. Id. § 46(b).
120. Id.
121. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (as amended 1980) states that "laws shall be passed more
clearly defining the rights of the spouses, in relation to separate and community property ...
122. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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separate property. The agreement obviates the need for a will with respect
to the property covered by the agreement, but the ownership interests in the
community and its management continue unaffected for the duration of the
marriage. Hence, such reciprocal agreements are not suitable will substi-
tutes unless the parties seek to dispose of the entire community estate or
designated community property holdings subject to such agreements remain
static. If community property investments are apt to change, this sort of
agreement does not provide an appropriate substitute for a will, unless the
parties describe the properties intended to be covered by the agreement with
some particularity.
Marital Partition. Because a community-survivorship agreement must be
between spouses and concerns only the community property of their mar-
riage, the agreement cannot extend beyond the duration of the couple's mar-
riage and its immediate aftermath. Although couples use a marital partition
primarily for the purpose of division rather than succession, the marital par-
tition also cannot extend beyond the duration of the marriage. In Marshall
v. Marshall,1 23 for example, spouses entered into a marital partition, ob-
tained a divorce, and subsequently remarried each other. In a divorce pro-
ceeding to dissolve the second marriage, the husband argued that their
partition of community property to be acquired in the future included com-
munity property acquired during their second marriage. The court rejected
this argument. 1 24 The partition applied only to the community property ac-
quired during the marriage subsisting at the time the couple entered into the
partition agreement. 125
One must distinguish a marital partition from a mere spousal agreement
on the one hand and a spousal contract on the other. In Carter v. Carter,'26
for example, the wife argued in a divorce suit that because land that the
husband contracted to purchase before marriage was conveyed to both
spouses during marriage, a presumption arose that the spouses agreed to
acquire the property during marriage as community property.127 The court
rejected this assertion, noting that the two cases cited to support the argu-
ment each involved property that the spouses acquired during marriage. 28
The higher authority cited by the court, however, also does not stand for this
proposition. 129 Such a presumption simply does not exist. Although the
Waco court of civil appeals made such an assertion in 1976,130 the statement
is erroneous. Spouses cannot convert separate property into community
123. 735 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Id. at 592.
125. Id.
126. 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
127. Id. at 780.
128. Id.; see Ray v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 372, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 538 F.2d
1228 (5th Cir. 1976); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777, 780 (1952).
129. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 780 (citing Belkin v. Ray, 142 Tex. 71, 78, 176 S.W.2d 162, 165-
66 (1943)).




property by agreement.131 Although the Texas Constitution allows a parti-
tion or exchange to transform community property into separate prop-
erty,132 the converse is not available either by agreement or by contract. 33
In a situation such as that presented in Carter, a presumption arises that one
spouse has made a gift of one-half of the property to the other spouse when
separate property is used to acquire property in the names of both spouses.
The ex-wife, however, evidently did not raise this argument.13 4
The facts of Harrington v. Harrington 135 lent themselves to a different
solution in a somewhat similar situation. Though not yet married, the
couple had lived together for three years in premises that they had leased in
the names of both persons. The couple then discussed buying a house. The
man undertook the obligation of the purchase-money note and took title in
his name because the woman had significantly more modest earnings. Both
parties contributed to improving the house. The couple later married. The
spouses always referred to the house as "ours," and the husband presented
no evidence that he ever claimed it as his own until the wife sued him for
divorce. Under these facts, the court concluded that the parties had in-
tended to purchase the house as partners, and that each spouse owned an
equal share in it. 136
While the constitutional amendment 137 primarily addresses community-
survivorship agreements, the amendment also includes a significant clarifica-
tion. Some attorneys who had not read the provisions of article XVI, section
15 with care found the section unclear as to whether spouses could partition
their future earnings. Although the provision clearly provided that persons
about to marry and spouses might partition all or any part of their commu-
nity property,1 38 these lawyers were puzzled by the constitutional provision
that allowed spouses to agree that the income from the separate property of
one spouse would be the separate property of the owner.139 The omission of
a reference to earnings in the latter provision suggested to casual readers
that spouses might not partition earnings as separate property. This sort of
argument perhaps in some degree resulted from wishful thinking. This latter
provision does not deal with partitions and exchanges at all. Instead, it deals
with written spousal agreements by which the income from the property of
one of the spouses becomes the separate property of the owner of the prop-
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
133. Forbidden transformations of property are enumerated in J. MCKNIGHT & W.
REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 20 (1983).
134. The court mentioned the issue but incorrectly observed that evidence of a gift to
change the character of the property must exist. Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). Although evidence to rebut the gift presumption
must exist, the evidence need not be very strong. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d
162, 167 (Tex. 1975) (Reavley, J., dissenting); Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 781.
135. 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
136. Id. at 724.
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erty.140 The drafters intended this clause to complement the provision by
which a gift by one spouse to the other spouse causes the income from that
property to be the separate property of the donee spouse unless the donor
otherwise provides. The draftsmen designed the provision with respect to
spousal agreements to allow spouses to agree as to future income from prop-
erty given by one spouse to the other spouse prior to the effective date of the
1980 amendment. The 1987 amendment clarified this provision. 141 So that
no one will conclude that the provision deals generally with agreements as to
income from the separate property of both spouses, section 15 now refers
specifically to the income from the separate property of only one of the
spouses.142 The amendment thus serves to distinguish the prior provision
dealing with marital partitions from the later clause allowing a spousal
agreement that the income from the separate property of only one spouse
will be that spouse's separate property.
One must also distinguish the marital partition from a divorce-property-
settlement agreement. Even though the latter may be in the form of a parti-
tion, the divorce court will review its terms under section 3.631 of the Fam-
ily Code,' 43 whereas a marital partition not made in anticipation of divorce
is not subject to such review. In Matthews v. Matthews ' the couple exe-
cuted a community partition just prior to the filing of the divorce petition.
The wife had contemplated filing a divorce petition for two months. The
agreement partitioned certain community assets to the husband, who under-
took to discharge some mutual debts and to hold the wife harmless for them.
In the divorce proceeding that later ensued, the wife asserted that the parti-
tion was a nullity, but she did not rely on the provisions of section 3.631.
Instead, the wife relied on the provisions of former section 5.45145 to assert
that she entered into the partition as a consequence of her husband's duress.
As section 5.45 then stood, the husband had the burden of disproving du-
ress. ' 46 The trial court held that the husband had failed to satisfy his burden
by clear and convincing evidence, as required by the statute. 47 In order to
make his wife comply with his wishes for partition of community assets, the
husband had threatened to seek sole custody of their son. Despite the law-
fulness of the husband's demands and threats to initiate custody proceedings
if the wife did not execute the agreement, the appellate court held that the




142. Id.; see McKnight, supra note 102, at 461-62. Other minor word changes were made
to the text of the provision. See TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15.
143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
144. 725 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45, amended and renumbered by Act of June 17, 1981, ch.
782, § 2, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2964, as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.55 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
146. Id.




Amendments of Premarital and Marital Partition Statutes. As the Matthews
case illustrates, the husband had a very heavy burden to discharge when
disproving duress.149 Once the trial court had ruled against the husband in
Matthews, the husband found prevailing on appeal virtually impossible. To
dispose of this burden of proof, the legislature enacted the Uniform Premari-
tal Agreement Act and supplemented it with adaptations of the prior stat-
utes dealing with marital partitions and other spousal agreements. 150
Regrettably, the draftsmen of the uniform act did not tailor the act to the
needs of Texas constituents. The enactment of the uniform law, therefore,
has created some new problems. The amendment covers both premarital
and marital partitions and exchanges. As in other cases of alleged civil
fraud, the new enactment places the burden of proof on the party who as-
serts duress or fraud. The party asserting duress must prove that the agree-
ment was "unconscionable when it was executed" and that the other party
failed to disclose relevant facts. 151 The language of the statute does not seem
to provide an objective standard of fairness or lack of fairness, but one can
equate unconscionability with lack of fairness. One of the major functions of
the community property doctrine, however, is to provide for the surviving
spouse. Therefore, stripping one's spouse of his or her share of prospective
community property without a reasonable substitute strongly suggests
unconscionability.
Because the draftsmen of the uniform act failed to take account of article
XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, 152 on which the validity of most
Texas premarital and marital partitions rests, application of the act causes
difficulty. Most agreements will take the form of partitions or exchanges of
community property that the couple will acquire in the future. The new
premarital agreement statute' 53 nowhere alludes to such agreements, and
although the provisions for marital partitions mirror the constitutional pro-
visions on that subject, no provision of the new act adequately replaces the
provisions of repealed section 5.41, which dealt with premarital agreements
made by minors. 154 The provision for amendment and revocation of pre-
marital agreements' 55 also seems to promise more than one can possibly at-
tain. As a matter of constitutional principle, a couple cannot reverse the
process of partition of future acquisitions of community property into sepa-
rate property to recreate the community. 156 The constitution does not allow
the creation of community property from separate property and, as a distinct
149. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
150. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 678, §§ 2-3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5063 (Vernon).
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.46 (premarital agreements), § 5.55 (other property agree-
ments) (Vernon Supp. 1988); see Annotation, Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Gov-
erning Support of Property Rights Upon Divorce or Separation as Affected by Fairness or
Adequacy of Those Terms-Modern Status, 53 A.L.R.4th 166, 196-99 (1987).
152. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15.
153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.46 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
154. Act of June 17, 1981, ch. 782, § 2, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2964, 2964-65, repealed by
Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 678, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5063, 5067 (Vernon).
155. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
156. See supra note 133.
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proposition, a partition amounts to a divestiture analogous to a convey-
ance.1 57 Hence, an amendment or revocation of a partition operates pro-
spectively only.' 58 A partition of future community property occurs at the
time of the agreement. The couple can curb its future effects most effectively
by inserting a term into the present agreement providing that the parties
may terminate the effect of the partition by mutual agreement at some future
time. So understood, the provisions of new section 5.45 are unexceptionable.
The amendment contains other unintentional omissions or misplaced pro-
visions. The subchapter on premarital agreements'5 9 does not include a
fraudulent transfer provision or a recordation provision. Although section
5.56 covers both of these matters, they are put under the second part of the
subchapter labeled "Other Property Agreements."' 60 The subchapter on
marital property agreements contains no provision on limitation of ac-
tions.' 6 1 Otherwise both subchapters have largely parallel provisions that
the draftsmen could have consolidated. At the next regular session, the leg-
islature should recast the entire subchapter.
Community Presumption. Section 5.02 of the Family Code presumes that all
acquisitions made during a marriage and all property on hand at the dissolu-
tion of a marriage are community property.' 6 2 A person who claims prop-
erty as part of his or her separate estate bears the burden of proving the
assertion. The standard of proof, however, has long been in doubt.' 63 Be-
cause of this doubt, the legislature amended section 5.02 of the Family Code
in 1987 to define the standard of proof as clear and convincing evidence.' 64
The Texas Constitution clearly states, however, that premarital acquisi-
tions constitute separate property.' 65 Thus, if a spouse can show that he or
she acquired property prior to his or her marriage, that spouse can satisfac-
torily prove the property's separate character. In Carter v. Carter,'66 as in
Wierzchula v. Wierzchula,167 the husband, prior to his marriage, entered into
an earnest money contract to purchase realty. In both instances the husband
closed the transaction during the marriage, and thus the grantor conveyed
the property during the marriage. The courts in both cases concluded that
the inception-of-title doctrine caused separate title to attach to the
157. Id.
158. See McKnight, supra note 102, at 460-61.
159. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41-.50 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
160. Id. § 5.56.
161. Id. §§ 5.51-.54. Such a provision existed in the part of the subehapter devoted to
premarital agreements. Id. § 5.48.
162. Id. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
163. See Hilliard v. Hilliard, 725 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ); J.
MCKNIGHT & W. REPPY, supra note 133, at 31-32; Tindall, supra note 47, at 1179; cf Samp-
son, Amendments to Title I and Title 2, Texas Family Code, 87-5 STATE BAR OF TEXAS SEC-
TION REPORT.
164. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
165. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
166. 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).




The Texas Constitution also defines donative acquisitions as separate
property. 169 Acquisitions from family members commonly are considered
gifts, but unless the acquiring spouse proves the donative separate character
of the acquisition, the community property presumption prevails. In Castle
v. Castle 170 the wife's father purchased an insurance policy on the life of
each of the spouses and later transferred each policy to each respective in-
sured spouse. The court found a gift to the insured spouse in each in-
stance. 17 1 Ellebracht v. Ellebracht 172 presented a more complex situation.
The husband asserted that ranch land conveyed to him by his mother was
his separate property. When the mother conveyed the western half of her
ranch to her son in 1961, the ranch was worth at least $90,000. The deed to
the husband, without any recital of separate ownership, stated a nominal
consideration. The husband, however, also assumed an indebtedness of
$30,000, secured by the property, and two unsecured notes for $10,000 each.
The husband also agreed to manage both halves of the ranch. In asserting
the donative character of the acquisition, the husband relied on Kiel v.
Brinkman, 173 which rested on a jury finding of a gift in circumstances simi-
lar to those before the court in Ellebracht. The court distinguished Kiel on
the basic facts of the contract supporting the transfer and arrived at the
conclusion that should have been reached in Kiel.174
Most often, but least successfully, divorcing spouses seek to rebut the
community property presumption by tracing separate assets either through a
succession of permutations or after their combination with community prop-
erty. In Hilliard v. Hilliard 175 the effort to trace a house to its alleged pre-
marital source failed for lack of evidence. 176 The husband in a divorce
proceeding asserted that prior to his marriage he owned stock in a corpora-
tion engaged in buying, repairing, and reselling houses. He testified that the
corporation dissolved during the marriage and that he received a house as
part of his share of the corporate assets upon liquidation. If the husband had
established these allegations by the introduction of evidence showing the
nexus between his separate corporate shares and the house, he would have
succeeded in tracing the acquisition to its alleged source. The trial court,
however, did not find the uncorroborated assertion convincing, and the ap-
pellate court found no basis for upsetting the lower court's conclusion. 17
The court in Carter v. Carter,178 examined another tracing effort. The
168. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 780-81; Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d at 732.
169. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
170. 734 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
171. Id. at 411.
172. 735 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
173. 668 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); see also Mc-
Knight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 101, at 6 (discusses Kiel).
174. Ellebracht, 735 S.W.2d at 659.
175. 725 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
176. Id. at 724.
177. Id.
178. 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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facts and conclusions stated in the opinion, however, are too fragmentary to
indicate any sort of clear holding. The husband's father gave him securities,
which a stock-exchange and a stock-split during the marriage transformed
into a different holding of securities, though still clearly the husband's sepa-
rate property. The husband pledged these shares as collateral for a broker's
margin account. The facts, however, do not reveal whether the shares se-
cured an existing indebtedness or a new indebtedness, and the court does not
recount the contractual terms of the margin agreement. Ultimately, the hus-
band liquidated the separate shares and paid the debt on the margin account
with the sale proceeds. The facts do not indicate that the husband incurred
any separate debts. If the husband did not incur separate debts, the husband
simply used separate property to secure and pay community obligations. 179
The appellate court, however, sustained the trial court's finding that corpo-
rate securities and an automobile bought from funds in the margin account
were the husband's separate property. 180 The court's explanation is singu-
larly unconvincing. The facts and the court's reference to the clear-and-.
convincing-evidence rule indicate that the court did not think that rules of
law affect the process of tracing assets through an account, as long as a
spouse denominates the account as his "separate account" and the assets
initially deposited in the account constituted separate property. 1" The
court totally ignored the apparent fact that the husband used borrowed
money to pay for the shares bought through the account. The husband ap-
parently pledged separate property as collateral to secure the loan, but the
Texas Supreme Court clearly held in Heidenheimer Bros. v. McKeen 182 in
1885 that such a pledge does not make the borrowed money separate prop-
erty. The court in Carter did not cite the supreme court's holding. Must we
conclude that the court's holding in Heidenheimer has been forgotten and
that the rule it stated has been lost through desuetude? 183
Over the years lower courts have struggled with the recurrent problem of
attempting to identify separate funds deposited with community funds in
bank accounts, brokerage accounts, and other modes of deposit from which
spouses make withdrawals and investments. The Supreme Court of Texas
rarely attempts to grapple with this problem. In McKinley v. McKinley 184
the court dealt with a deposit of separate funds in an account that bore peri-
odic interest. Because the owner of the separate funds withdrew amounts
identical to the interest amounts, the court deemed the owner to have with-
drawn the community increments of interest.'l8 That process of keeping
separate funds segregated has come to be known as the identical-sum infer-
179. That is, if the husband's creditor did not agree to look to the husband's separate prop-
erty as the sole source of satisfaction, the indebtedness is customarily called a "community
debt," although the creditor can seek satisfaction from either community or separate assets.
180. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 780.
181. Id. at 778-79.
182. 63 Tex. 229, 230 (1885).
183. In every recent reported appellate case dealing with separate property security, the
court has shown no awareness of Heidenheimer Bros.
184. 496 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1973).
185. Id. at 543.
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ence.18 6 This inference is based on the depositor's supposed intention. 187
Most recently, in Estate of Hanau v. Hanau,88 the Texas Supreme Court
dealt with a somewhat similar situation. The husband maintained an ac-
count with a securities broker. At the time of his marriage, the account
contained 200 shares of Texaco stock; the Texaco shares were, therefore, the
husband's separate property. The account also held other shares of various
corporations, which the husband bought during the marriage. The husband
could not trace the source of these other securities to premarital property.
During the marriage, the husband sold the 200 Texaco shares for $5,755 and
on the same day purchased 200 shares of a different security for $6,170. The
court identified the source of the purchase-money as the sales proceeds from
the Texaco stock, the husband's separate property. 18 9 Although the court
did not explain its line of reasoning, the court's conclusion must rest on an
inference of intent on the part of the depositor acting through his broker.
The sale and purchase during the same day for a similar sum implies an
identity of subject matter. The enactment, however, of the clear-and-con-
vincing evidence standard during the 1987 special legislative session throws
the precedential value of the McKinley and Hanau cases into considerable
doubt. Whether a fact finder could exercise inferences such as those in-
dulged in McKinley and Hanau within the clear-and-convincing evidence
standard is open to doubt.
Tort Recovery. Reviewing the course of legal development of tortious recov-
ery when both spouses seek to recover for injuries arising out of the same
facts, Justice Countiss in Johnson v. Holly Farms 190 provided the best cur-
rent summary of the subject' 91 and restated the matrimonial property rules
for parental recovery for the loss of their child. 192 In Johnson an employee
of the husband-father drove the car in which the couple's daughter rode as a
passenger. The car collided with a truck driven by the defendant's agent,
and the daughter was killed in the collision. The father and mother sought
damages for their pecuniary loss, loss of companionship of their daughter,
and their mental pain and anguish. The jury found the father's driver sixty
percent responsible for the accident, thus precluding either community or
separate recovery by the father. With respect to the mother, however, the
court did not impute the father's agent's negligence to her with respect to
her separate property claim.193 The parent's pecuniary loss consisted of the
care, support, advice, and other similar contributions of pecuniary value that
186. See Holloway v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51, 60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
187. Id.
188. 730 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1987). Another aspect of Hanau is noted in McKnight, Family
Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1987) [hereinafter
McKnight, 1987 Annual Survey].
189. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 667.
190. 731 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
191. Id. at 646.
192. Id. at 645-46.
193. Id. at 646.
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the daughter would have given to the parent. 194 Hence, the mother based
her loss on a'separate property claim and submitted the issue of damages
accordingly. The mother's loss of her daughter's companionship and her
own mental pain and anguish were, of course, personal to her. The mother's
recovery for those losses therefore constituted her separate property. 195
Interest in Business Entities. Only in rare instances of actual or constructive
fraud might a court analyze a spouse's management of a separate interest in
a business entity and brush aside the entity's existence as a sham. 196 The
Fort Worth court of appeals found one of those extreme situations in Zis-
blatt v. Zisblatt.197 In Zisblatt the husband had handled all of his personal-
service contracts through a corporation, which he controlled through his
ownership of separate shares. In Robbins v. Robbins 198 the Eastland court of
appeals also examined allegations of a corporate alter ego but found nothing
that smacked of fraudulent objectives or even sloppy business practices.' 99
The evidence before the court did not lead to the conclusion that the de-
ceased husband, as separate shareholder of a controlling interest in a corpo-
ration, made him and the corporation identical in law.2°° The deceased
husband had worked intensely and had devoted his full attention to his busi-
ness. The husband had held and exercised control of the corporation, served
as its board-chairman and president, and made all major decisions for the
corporation. The evidence also showed that management operated the cor-
poration in a manner strictly consistent with its existence as a distinct and
independent entity. The board of directors observed all corporate formali-
ties and never intermingled corporate assets with those of the husband. Fur-
thermore, the corporation owned all the assets it used in the business,
accounted for and paid all of its tax obligations, and hired its own employ-
ees. The corporation did not furnish the husband-president with any goods
or services except for a car, which he used at least partially for business
purposes. The evidence, therefore, did not establish that the decedent used
the business in a self-serving manner or established the business as his alter
ego. 20'
The character of a family business was at issue before the Houston first
court of appeals in Thomas v. Thomas.202 The husband had inherited shares
of a subchapter S corporation, which he operated. During the marriage the
husband had taken advantage of the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code enabling him to pay income taxes on the corporate income as though
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
197. 693 S.W.2d 944, 955-56 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd).
198. 727 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. Id. at 747.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 738 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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the corporation were a partnership. 20 3 In the course of the marriage, the
corporation had retained a sizeable amount of profits. At the time of di-
vorce, the corporation had decided to distribute these profits to its stock-
holders. The character of these retained, but already taxed, earnings was at
issue in the divorce suit. 20 4 A divided court concluded that, in spite of the
federal tax treatment of the business income, the business operated as a cor-
porate entity, and the retained profits constituted the corporation's prop-
erty.20 5 A dissenting judge, however, concluded that since the corporation
paid taxes on the retained profits as though the business were a partnership,
the court should treat the profits as those of a partnership, rather than of a
corporation. 20 6 In light of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1961,207 how-
ever, whether the status of the business as a corporation or as a partnership
should make any difference in characterizing the retained earnings is ques-
tionable. In either case, the retained earnings should constitute the business
entity's property. The dissenting judge apparently was thinking of pre-1962
partnership law, which considered a partnership as simply an aggregate of
partners, rather than as an entity.20 8 Under the post-1961 law, however,
most authorities agree that partnerships are entities like corporations, and
hence partnership assets belong to the entity, not to the partners. 2° 9
When and if a corporation distributes the retained profits to its stockhold-
ers, however, their characterization as the stockholders' marital property
presents a distinct question. The answer to this question does not necessarily
follow from the conclusion that an entity owns the profits. On this point the
Thomas majority opinion is not altogether clear. If the corporation merely
distributes its profits to its shareholders as a cash dividend, a married share-
holder will receive community property. If the entity distributes capitalized
earnings, the dividend might constitute a partial liquidating dividend, which
holders of separate shares would receive as separate property. In Hilliard v.
203. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West Supp. 1988); see also id. §§ 701-709 (partnership
provisions).
204. Thomas, 738 S.W.2d at 344-45.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 348 (Bass, J., dissenting and concurring).
207. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1988) (effective Janu-
ary 1, 1962).
208. In Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 739 P.2d 273 (1987), the court reached a conclu-
sion similar to that of the dissenting judge in Thomas, though not because the court failed to
consider the partnership as an entity, but because the earnings were community property
whether distributed or retained. Id., 739 P.2d at 279. This conclusion rested on the court's
interpretation of Idaho's statute defining community property and on previous judicial prece-
dents. Less than six months before Swope, however, the Idaho Court of Appeals had reached a
contrary conclusion in Brazier v. Brazier, 111 Idaho 692, 726 P.2d 1143 (Ct. App. 1986). The
court analogized a partnership to a corporation. Id. at 1147. The court went on to say, how-
ever, that corporate concepts do not carry over to a partnership setting because partners, un-
like corporate officers, have direct and immediate control over the partnership's assets and
income. Swope, 739 P.2d at 281.
209. See Bromberg, Commentary on the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, 17 TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. 300-01, 321 (Vernon 1970) and other authorities cited in Marshall v. Mar-
shall, 735 S.W.2d 587, 594 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a recent comment
on the subject from a national perspective, see Goldstein & Goode, Entity and Aggregate Theo-
ries of Partnership: The Need for Clarification, 1 PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 15, 16-18.
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Hilliard 210 the facts did not indicate clearly whether the husband received a
salary, a monetary dividend, or a liquidating dividend in kind, as he asserted.
But if a corporation does not distribute its capital, the value of retained cor-
porate earnings will enhance the value of separate shares. A nondistribution
of earnings causes the separate shareholder to owe reimbursement to the
community estate for the earnings retained that otherwise would have been
distributed as community cash dividends.211
This analysis of the corporate business activities in Thomas v. Thomas
comports with the Dallas appeals court's handling of partnership dealings in
Marshall v. Marshall.212 In Marshall the husband participated in a partner-
ship, which the court denominated as an entity under the Partnership Act of
1961.213 Thus, property transferred by each partner to the partnership as
partnership capital became partnership property, and income from that
property later distributed to a married partner constituted community prop-
erty. 214 In Marshall the partnership had acquired mineral interests prior to
the spouses' marriage. The husband, therefore, argued that the royalties re-
ceived by the partnership and passed on to him as partnership distributions
remained his separate property, just as if he had owned the mineral interests
as his own separate property. The court held, however, that the partnership
owned the mineral interests, and the profits from them were merely partner-
ship income, which, when paid to the married partner, constituted commu-
nity property. 215 The partnership constituted an intervening entity, not a
mere conduit. 216
Termination of Community Interest. In two recent cases courts discussed
the possible extinguishment of spousal interests by events other than divorce.
Stubbs v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 217 presented the situation of a
widow whose remarriage caused a temporary cessation of her receipt of
death benefits under her first husband's employment plan. The federal dis-
trict court held that, by obtaining an annulment of her second marriage, the
widow once again became entitled to receive monthly payments under the
benefit plan.2 18 In Allard v. Frech2 19 the Fort Worth court of appeals re-
fused to adopt the terminable interest rule, which would cause a dying
spouse to lose his or her community interest in a pension earned by the other
210. 725 S.W.2d 722, 722-23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
211. See McKnight, Reimbursement for Uncompensated Labor Rendered for a Closely-
Held Corporation and Some Other Comments on Jensen v. Jensen, 3 ADVOC., Dec. 1984, at 8,
12-13.
212. 735 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. Id. at 593-94; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp.
1988).
214. Marshall, 735 S.W.2d at 594-95.
215. Id. at 593-95.
216. Id.
217. 653 F. Supp. 299 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
218. Id. at 300.




spouse.220 The terminable interest rule effectively precludes the deceased
nonpensioner spouse from transferring his or her community interest in the
pension by will or intestacy. 221 The court of appeals noted that a question so
fraught with competing policy considerations is best left to the state legisla-
ture or supreme court.222 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed. 223
Reimbursement. In Gay v. Gay2 2 4 the El Paso court of appeals reiterated
and applied the principle that the Texas Supreme Court initially espoused in
Vallone v. Vallone:225 one must plead a reimbursement claim in order to
realize any recovery. 226 In divorce proceedings spouses also may plead
claims for tortious injury and breach of contracts. In pleading for reim-
bursement, however, a spouse will lose consequential damages and prior in-
terest. Although a separate right of reimbursement, like other separate
interests, is not subject to division upon divorce, a community right of reim-
bursement may be divided or awarded to one spouse in full. If only a small
amount of community property is to be divided and the spouse against
whom recovery is sought has significant earning power or separate property,
pleading a wrong as an independent cause of action is usually advisable if the
cause of action exists as such. A money judgment may be attained more
readily for an independent cause of action than for reimbursement.
The right of reimbursement arises in a number of varied circumstances,
such as when the marital estate has benefited at the expense of one spouse or
when the marital estate has suffered a detriment as a consequence of one
spouse's act. Thus, when one spouse makes a gift of community property to
a third person without the consent of the other spouse, the donor-spouse
must reimburse the other spouse's share, but only if the donor made the gift
unreasonably under the circumstances. 227 In Marshall v. Marshall228 the
court deemed reasonable the husband's gifts of community property to his
child of a prior marriage and to her son.229 Thus, a right of reimbursement
did not arise.230 On the other hand, the husband's use of community prop-
erty to discharge his premarital debts gave rise to a right of reimburse-
ment.23 1 A court will not apply a reasonableness test in that context.
220. Id. at 315.
221. In Allard the surviving husband argued for adoption of the terminable interest rule in
objecting to the probate court's approval of the inventory prepared by the deceased wife's
executrix. The inventory included his late wife's community interest in her husband's retire-
ment plan.
222. Allard, 735 S.W.2d at 315.
223. Allard v. Frech, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 371, 373 (May 4, 1988).
224. 737 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
225. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
226. Gay, 737 S.W.2d at 96; Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459; see Morgan v. Morgan, 725
S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ); McKnight, supra note 188, at 10.
227. See J. McKNIGHT & W. REPPY, supra note 133, at 170.
228. 735 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Id. at 596-97.
230. Id. The Austin court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Tabassi v. NBC
Bank-San Antonio, 737 S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. Marshall, 735 S.W.2d at 595-96.
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Similarly, in Carter v. Carter232 the court required the separate estate to
reimburse the community for community funds used to discharge a
purchase-money note secured by separate property.233 The court there also
awarded reimbursement for community improvements on separate
property.2 3 4
In Kotria v. Kotrla 235 the court also distinguished between a reimbursable
claim for a contribution to enhance the community estate2 36 and a
nonreimbursable claim for separate funds used for the support of a family.237
No reason exists, however, for this distinction; it is out of step with the mod-
em concept of reimbursement enunciated by the Texas Supreme Court.2 38
In Kotria the wife brought what amounted to a claim for her husband's con-
version of her separate property. The wife's evidence apparently was so
meager and conflicting, however, that the trial court was unable to conclude
that the husband owed compensation to the wife. Although spouses com-
monly use each other's separate personalty in a marriage, the fact that mar-
riage offers the opportunity for such use does not necessarily preclude a
spouse's recovery for conversion. If a spouse proves an unauthorized taking
or destruction of his or her separate personalty, a court should award dam-
ages for such loss. Misuse of community property or its fraudulent disposi-
tion, however, is a different matter. In such a case, reimbursement is the
proper remedy for a spouse's loss. In Mazique v. Mazique,239 however, the
court not only awarded damages for a fraudulent disposition of community
property, but exemplary damages as well.24°
Removing the bar of interspousal immunity has produced a degree of mis-
understanding of interspousal causes of action. At the threshold, the term
"interspousal immunity" has caused some of the confusion. The existence of
a bar to suit between spouses tended to obscure the further fact that certain
marital wrongs do not constitute causes of action between spouses, even if no
law bars such a suit. Hurt feelings, even severe ones, losses of community
property, and wrongful dispositions of community property inevitably result
from a marital relationship. The parties must bear these injuries without
recovery at law or seek any relief from the divorce court in the division of
232. Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
233. Id. at 780.
234. Id. at 779, 78 1.
235. 718 S.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. See Schmidt v. Huppmann, 73 Tex. 112, 116, 11 S.W. 175, 176 (1889); Horlock v.
Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
237. See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953); Oliver v.
Oliver, 741 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Trevino v. Trevino, 555
S.W.2d 792, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
238. The Houston court of appeals [14th Dist.] made a significant inroad upon this distinc-
tion in Hilton v. Hilton, 678 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ). See also McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39
Sw. L.J. 1, 10 (1985) [hereinafter McKnight, 1985 Annual Survey] (discusses Hilton). But the
distinction itself is irrational and the Texas Supreme Court ought to repudiate it.
239. 742 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
240. Id. at 808. This conclusion constitutes a serious conceptual error.
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property upon the winding up of marriage.241 Alternatively, the spouses
may recover for such injuries by way of reimbursement when a marriage is
dissolved by death.
Through the removal of the bar of interspousal immunity, one spouse is
subject to suit by the other spouse for causes of action that any third person
might bring. Wrongs arising from the marital relationship, however, have
not become actionable because of the removal of the bar. Courts have never
recognized such wrongs as arise from breaches of marital vows as general
causes of action. The remedy for marital breach is divorce. In the course of
granting relief, the court may take improper acts into account in the division
of community property,242 of which the right of community reimbursement
is an integral part.243
In a rare instance in which a spouse has wantonly wasted or misappropri-
ated community property, a court has in the past awarded a money judg-
ment to the deprived spouse.244 Opinions may differ as to the propriety of
such awards. The fact that such decisions are rare indicates the doubt that
trial courts entertain concerning such a remedy. In Mazique the court
awarded a money judgment for constructively fraudulent dispositions of
community property. While such an award may be a proper exercise of judi-
cial power, a court cannot properly term the award "damages." Further-
more, an additional award of exemplary damages certainly is not
appropriate.
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Solely or Jointly Managed Community Property. By a literal application of
section 5.22(a) of the Family Code, 24 5 the joint acquisition of community
property in the names of both spouses makes the property subject to their
joint management. 246 Analogy to section 5.22(b), 247 which deals specifically
with the mixing of property already acquired and subject to the respective
sole control of each spouse, leads to the same conclusion. At any rate, a
purchaser would be foolish to accept a transfer of property from only one of
the spouses if the title is held in the names of both spouses. Such title sug-
gests either that the spouses jointly manage the community property or that
the nonjoining spouse may possess a separate property interest in it. If prop-
erty is held in the name of only one spouse, however, section 5.24(a)248 pro-
tects a good faith purchaser who deals only with the title-holding spouse. In
addition, as the court said in Fa/kus v. First National Bank,249 as between
241. See Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 246-47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
245. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975).
246. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 170-71 (Tex. 1974); Cooper v. Texas
Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974).
247. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (Vernon 1975).
248. Id. § 5.24(a).
249. 735 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
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that spouse and a third person, a presumption arises that the title-holding
spouse solely manages the property. 250 Further, the fact that the spouses in
Fajkus subsequently joined in transactiohs concerning the property did not
necessarily mean that the spouses jointly managed the property, though such
acts may have evidenced a spousal agreement to manage the property
jointly.25 1
Disposition of Solely Managed Community Property. Because each spouse
possesses full authority to manage the community profits of his or her sepa-
rate property and the products of individual labor without any interference
by the other spouse, 2 5 2 the spousal manager may dispose of such community
property gratuitously during marriage. Prior to the enactment of the Matri-
monial Property Act of 1967, courts intimated that the other spouse might
bring suit to deter the wasting of community assets. 253 Although this rem-
edy may still subsist, spouses seldom pursue it.254 Instead, on dissolution of
marriage by divorce, annulment, or death, the other spouse will seek reim-
bursement for his or her share of the donated property in settlement of mari-
tal accounts between the spouses.
As a corollary to a spouse's right of sole management of the profits of his
or her property and labor, the law allows a spouse to make gratuitous dispo-
sitions of reasonable amounts of solely managed community property with-
out reimbursing the other spouse for his or her share of the property given
away. 255 The burden of showing the reasonableness of a particular disposi-
tion, nonetheless, falls on the donor or the donee, rather than upon the
spouse claiming reimbursement. 256 Whether a gift is reasonable depends on
the "size and adequacy of the estate remaining to support the [surviving
spouse].... the community estate, and the relationship of the donor to the
donee." 257 Except in cases of a relatively small community estate, the bur-
den of showing that the gift was reasonable is not onerous. 258 Regardless of
the reasonableness of the transfer, the donee is always entitled to the donor's
share of such gifts of community property.2 59 In Tabassi v. NBC Bank-San
250. Id. at 886.
251. Id.
252. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).
253. See Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219,
1221 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1936, no writ); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d 1076, 1078 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ).
254. But see Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1968, no writ); Moore v. California-W. States Life Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd).
255. Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421, 425
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. Givens, 490 S.W.2d at 425-26.
257. Tabassi v. NBC Bank-San Antonio, 737 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Id.; cf Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 60-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
259. Tabassi, 737 S.W.2d at 617.
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Antonio260 the deceased donor-husband had made inter vivos gifts of nearly
half a million dollars to his two sons by a prior marriage. The spouses had
entered into an agreement prior to their six-year marriage in which they
acknowledged the husband's duty to support his two sons. Out of other
property, the decedent adequately provided for the widow and one child of
the second marriage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's conclu-
sion that the decedent's gratuitous dispositions were not "unfair" to the
widow. 261
In Tabassi the surviving spouse's right to recover for constructive fraud
was in the nature of a claim for reimbursement,262 which a spouse can assert
only upon marital dissolution.263 In this type of case, therefore, the court
must determine the adequacy of the community estate left for the surviving
spouse at the time of marital dissolution, not at the time the gift was
made.2 64 In Tabassi, in light of the survivor's undertaking in the premarital
agreement, the court concluded that the decedent had not committed a con-
structive fraud against the surviving spouse.265
Liability of a Spouse for Obligations Incurred by the Other Spouse. The prin-
cipal issue in Tabassi was not the alleged constructive fraud, but rather the
effect of a liability for nearly $950,000 of past due federal income taxes on
the husband's testamentary dispositions. 266 During the decedent's lifetime,
neither he nor his wife realized that they owed taxes on community income
from the decedent's foreign separate property. The widow contended that
the husband's testamentary direction to "pay all my taxes" from his residu-
ary estate reflected the husband's intention that his estate relieve the widow's
share of the community property from liability for half of the taxes due.
Both the trial and the appellate courts approached the question as one of
testamentary construction. 267 Both courts considered the will clear and un-
ambiguous on its face and presumed that the husband knew the applicable
state and federal law when making his will. 268
As a fundamental proposition, both Texas law and federal tax law attri-
bute liability to persons, rather than property. The federal rule differs from
the Texas rule, however, with regard to what marital property the taxing
authority may reach to satisfy liability. For the collection of federal income
taxes, the law attributes half of the community income to each spouse.269
Texas law, on the other hand, makes community property available for the
discharge of liability on the basis of its management. 270 The law allows the
260. Id. at 612.
261. Id. at 616.
262. Id. at 616.
263. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
264. See id.
265. Tabassi, 737 S.W.2d at 617.
266. Id. at 615-16.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. I.R.C. § 6321 (West Supp. 1988).
270. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
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spouse who did not incur the liability nevertheless to move for marshalling
so that the burden of liability may fall on the particular property most
closely related to the spouse incurring liability.27 1 Although the Probate
Code lacks a provision for marshalling of decedents' estates, the surviving
spouse still may be able to invoke the marshalling provisions of the Family
Code272 in fixing liability for an inter vivos obligation. As the Tabassi case
indicates, how a surviving spouse might employ the marshalling statute to
improve his or her position in the case of federal tax liability remains
unclear.273
Prior to the clarification of the spousal liability principles at the 1987 spe-
cial legislative session,2 7 4 a bankruptcy court again dealt with the issue of
spousal liability in connection with the extent of the debtor's estate. In In re
Ewald 2 7 5 the husband's bankruptcy trustee sought to include in the hus-
band's bankruptcy estate his community share in his wife's noncontributory
pension plan maintained by her employer. 276 Assuming that the wife's en-
tire interest in the pension constituted community property, the court con-
cluded that because the wife's interest was subject to her sole management
and therefore was not liable for the husband's nontortious debts, 277 the
trustee could not include the pension interest in the husband's bankruptcy
estate. 278 In order for the pension interest to have been includable in the
estate, it must have been "liable for an allowable claim against the
debtor.'279 In this instance, all of the husband's debts apparently were
nontortious. Even if the husband had incurred tortious liabilities, however,
the spendthrift clause of this typical pension trust would have protected the
pension interest.280
Homestead: Designation and Extent. In In re Niland 28 1 a couple had estab-
lished their home on a urban tract of 1.5 acres in 1971. In order to procure a
business loan in 1982, the homeowner gave a deed of trust on the property,
falsely representing that the property was not a homestead even though the
debtor had maintained a homestead on the property since purchasing it.
Thus, the lender's mortgage was valid only as to the nonhomestead portion
of the realty. 282 In August, 1983 the lender purportedly sold the entire
property at a foreclosure sale. The homestead claimant refused to vacate the
271. Id. § 5.62.
272. Estate of Fulmer v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 302, 308 (1984). There the court applied the
marshalling statute so that the decedent's tortious liability fell on his share of the community
before reaching the surviving spouse's share, thus entitling the decedent's estate to an estate
tax deduction for the entire amount of the judgment debt. Id.
273. Tabassi, 737 S.W.2d at 615-16.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 42-51.
275. 73 Bankr. 792 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
276. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
277. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22, 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
278. Ewald, 73 Bankr. at 795.
279. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(B) (1982).
280. Ewald, 73 Bankr. at 795.
281. 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1987).
282. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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premises, however, and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale brought suit for
possession in 1984. One month later, the homestead claimant filed for bank-
ruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee instituted an action against the purchaser
to set aside the foreclosure sale. The trustee removed the purchaser's suit for
possession to the bankruptcy court and consolidated it with the trustee's
action against the purchaser.
In November 1983 the Texas Constitution was amended to allow the legis-
lature to redefine the urban homestead as not more than one acre,28 3 instead
of a lot worth $10,000 at the time of designation, as it had been defined since
1970.284 The legislature had already implemented the amendment with a
statute that became effective upon approval of the amendment. 28  The stat-
ute redefined the urban homestead as one acre and further provided that the
definition applied "to all homesteads in this state regardless of the date they
were created."' 28 6 The provision's purpose was to redefine all homesteads
then in existence so that homestead claims would not be interrupted. The
legislature did not intend that the new definition affect the validity or extent
of any prior transaction; the statute was to attach prospectively to existing
homesteads only. Thus, in Niland, a prospective application of the statutory
definition would have resulted in the purchaser's acquiring what the lender
had: a secured interest in the nonhomestead portion of the premises, as de-
fined by the law in effect when the homestead was designated in 197 1.287
On no basis other than the language of the statute applying the definition
to "all homesteads in this state whenever created," the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the legislature meant to redefine existing homesteads
from their date of designation and thus to affect all transactions antedating
the amendment. 288 By this analysis, therefore, the purchaser would take the
nonhomestead excess of the property as defined more than three months
after his purchase. No one has produced a shred of evidence that the legisla-
ture intended the words, "homesteads ... whenever created" to mean ex-
isting homesteads from the date of their designation, rather than homesteads
already existing or to be acquired in the future. Furthermore, proponents of
the amendments to the Texas Constitution had assumed that the contract
clause of the United States Constitution289 precluded a state from changing
283. Id. § 51.
284. Id. § 51 (1970, amended 1983).
285. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309 (codified at TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1984)).
286. Id. § 2. In Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-612 (1986) the Attorney General concluded
that neither a cooperative apartment nor the corporate stock by which ownership is evidenced
is exempt under Texas homestead law.
287. See Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e.
per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
288. In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 807 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing In re Stans, 52 Bankr. 405,
413 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (Randall, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation)). A bankruptcy court
reached the same conclusion in In re Barnhart, 47 Bankr. 277, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The correlative provision of TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16, would
of course give way to a later provision of the same document if that was the intent of the later
amendment. Giving the legislature power to redefine the urban homestead in terms of size,
rather than value, of an amount of "not more than one acre" is certainly not indicative of any
such intent, however.
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exemption laws to leave less of the debtor's property available for the con-
tract's enforcement than when the parties made the contract. The United
States Supreme Court had held in two cases that the contract clause pro-
tected even unsecured creditors in such instances. 290 That the contract
clause did not protect a secured creditor in this instance seems unimaginable!
Of course, in 1934 the United States Supreme Court had allowed the exercise
of state police power to overcome the strictures of the contract clause in
order to defer payment of mortgages in a time of economic emergency.291
No one, however, suggested any need for the exercise of Texas's police
power in 1983 to cause mortgagees to lose part of their security through
subsequent redefinition of the property subject to mortgage. An enormous
difference exists between deferring enforcement of security and causing it to
be lost entirely.
Apart from this fundamental objection to the court's application of the
1983 constitutional amendment and legislative enactment to existing, valid
mortgages of nonhomestead property, the Niland court's summary of Texas
homestead law is exemplary in every respect. 292 The homestead claimant's
waiver of his homestead interest in the property that he purported to mort-
gage was clearly ineffective. 293 The fact that the homestead claimant had
recorded an instrument stating that other property that he did not occupy
constituted his homestead was also irrelevant. 294 Further, the claimant's re-
maining in possession of the premises at all times prior to the foreclosure
sale put the purchaser at the sale on constructive notice of the possible
homestead claim.295 In Niland the court reiterated the conclusion of In re
Daves296 that a purchaser under these circumstances is not entitled to any
equitable lien on the homestead property to secure his purchase price.297
Rather, the purchaser merely assumes the rights of the lender against the
borrower through subrogation as a result of acquiring the lender's security in
the property. 298
At the time of the trial in 1984 statutory authority existed for a rural-
homestead claimant to designate his homestead out of a larger rural acre-
age.299 By analogy to that statutory right, the federal district court in Ni-
land held that an urban claimant might also designate one acre of the 1.5
acres as his urban homestead, and the appellate court affirmed that conclu-
sion. 30 0 The Fifth Circuit court also pointed out a number of very cogent
reasons for not binding a homestead claimant to certain misrepresentations
290. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 607 (1877); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610,
623-24 (1872).
291. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934).
292. In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 808-12 (5th Cir. 1987).
293. Id. at 808.
294. Id. at 809.
295. Id. at 812.
296. 770 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1985).
297. Niland, 825 F.2d at 814; Daves, 770 F.2d at 1369.
298. Niland, 825 F.2d at 813.
299. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 1984).
300. Niland, 825 F.2d at 815-16.
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as to the claimed homestead property. 30'
In 1985, when the legislature extended to urban claimants the statutory
right to designate a homestead from a larger tract,30 2 the legislature repealed
the provisions for recording designations in such instances. 30 3 The legisla-
ture repealed those provisions for the very reasons that the Fifth Circuit
court suggested, as well as the fact that a recorded designation causes confu-
sion when a homestead is changed. 3° 4 Nevertheless, at its 1987 session the
legislature restored the record-designation provision. 30 5 Lenders must re-
member, however, that such recorded designations do not estop the claimant
from asserting a true homestead claim contrary to the designated homestead,
unless the facts of property use make the designated tract as much a home-
stead as some other tract. 30 6
As exemplified by Fajkus v. First National Bank,30 7 the usual manner of
designating property as a homestead is by use. 30 8 Hence, rural acreage may
be so designated, though the family may actually live on a nearby parcel. 3° 9
Use of the entire property for the family's benefit is the test for establishing a
homestead.3 10 If a family cannot use a real property interest for its benefit,
then the family cannot claim the interest as part of a homestead. In In re
Poer 311 the debtor resided on a four-acre rural tract adjoining another tract
on which he owned one-half of the subsurface, but no interest in the surface.
In a situation in which the debtor showed no actual use of the minerals for
family purposes, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor could not claim
the mineral interest as part of his homestead. 31 2
In In re Moody 31 3 the court first addressed the question whether the un-
married debtor's one-hundred-acre home carved out of a larger tract of 575
acres of undeveloped land on the western end of Galveston Island consti-
tuted a rural, rather than an urban, homestead as of the date of the debtor's
bankruptcy petition. The debtor acquired the large tract during the 1960s
and had continuously maintained his home at the east end of the property
since 1965. In 1977 the land was brought within the incorporated bounda-
ries of the city of Galveston, which extends twenty-five miles to the west of
the tract and provides water and fire protection to the property. The debtor
had used the land for raising cattle, as other land owners had done on lands
301. Id. at 809.
302. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.022 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
303. Id. §§ 41.021-.024 (Vernon 1984), repealed by Act of 1985, ch. 840, § 1, Tex. Gen.
Laws 2906-07.
304. See McKnight, Commentary on Texas Homestead Law, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1307,
1315 (1986), which recites almost verbatim the commentary presented to the legislature in the
proposed statutory amendments of 1985.
305. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
306. See Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 89-90, 13 S.W. 12, 13-14 (1890).
307. 735 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
308. Id. at 884.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 887.
311. 76 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
312. Id. at 100.
313. 77 Bankr. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
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to the east and south of the debtor's tract. Although beach houses and a
heavily travelled road lay to the south of the tract, all considered, the court
concluded that the property constituted a rural homestead. 314
Motivated by an intent to defraud his creditors, the debtor in Moody had
from time to time made sham transfers of parts of the property, but these
transfers and retransfers from the recipients did not affect the maintenance
of the homestead. 315 Likewise, temporary holding of the property by a
wholly owned corporation did not alter the debtor's homestead rights.31 6
The court, however, rejected the debtor's argument that an exemption of
merely one hundred acres of realty for unmarried persons as compared to
two hundred acres for families violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 31 7 Thus, in spite
of the fraudulent motive behind his acts, the debtor's dealings with his
homestead could not defraud his creditors.318 In a companion case, Smith v.
Moody,319 the court concluded that the debtor's creditors were not entitled
to any equitable lien on his homestead.320 If the debtor diverted nonexempt
assets into the homestead, the creditors' remedy is to move for denial of his
discharge.321
Homestead: Fixing and Enforcing Liens. The Texas Constitution allows fix-
ing of liens on homestead property for purposes of purchase money, cost of
improvements, and the payment of taxes against the property. 322 In order to
establish a lien for improvements, the Constitution requires that both
spouses execute the lien in writing before the contractor commences work. 323
In Hruska v. First State Bank 324 the lender discovered, after making an in-
terim loan for homestead improvements, that the borrowers had failed to
314. Id. at 592-93.
315. Id. at 589-90.
316. Id. at 594-95.
317. Id. at 593; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
318. Id. at 595. The creditors did not argue, however, that the homestead lost its exempt
status by voluntary transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1982).
319. 77 Bankr. 566 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
320. Id. at 576-77.
321. Id. at 580; see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1982); First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Reed (In re
Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80
Bankr. 953, 963-64 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
322. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. Although a lien put on a homestead is void unless for
purchase money, improvements, or taxes, id., a conveyance of a homestead to discharge any
debt of the owner is valid, Huizar v. Bank of Robstown (In re Huizar), 71 Bankr. 826, 830
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
In 1987 the legislature amended the Texas Human Resources Code to provide that govern-
ment payments for medical assistance create a lien encumbering the "property and estate" of
the recipient. TEX. HUM. Rrs. CODE ANN. § 32.0331(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Apparently
the "property and estate" includes the recipient's homestead property as well. The Texas De-
partment of Human Resources cannot enforce such a lien during the recipient's life, however,
nor can the Department enforce the lien if the recipient is survived by his or her spouse or by
the recipient's dependent or disabled child. Id. § 32.0331(b). This provision presents no evi-
dent constitutional infirmity.
323. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; Kepley v. Zachry, 131 Tex. 554, 557, 116 S.W.2d 699,
700-01 (1938).
324. 727 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ granted).
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execute a lien because they had fraudulently misrepresented to the lender
that they had already executed such a lien at the time the loan was made.
For their fraud the court entered judgment against the borrowers in an
amount equal to the amount of the loan plus interest, and the court placed
an equitable lien on the homestead property. 325 The court achieved this
seeming circumvention of the constitutional rule3 26 by relying on Lincoln v.
Bennett,3 27 in which the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation.
At first glance the result in Hruska may seem inconsistent with the supreme
court's holdings concerning homestead claimants' misrepresentations in con-
nection with a lien fixed on homestead property that the claimant had mis-
represented as not having homestead character.3 28 The difference, the court
said, is that the misrepresentation that gives rise to an estoppel, as in Lincoln
and Hruska, is that associated with a lien that would be properly fixed on a
homestead, 329 whereas the other line of cases deals with a lien that cannot
attach to homestead property.330
In Inwood Homeowners'Association v. Harris331 the Texas Supreme Court
enunciated a further exception to the rule against establishing liens on home-
steads. In Inwood the developers of a tract of homes created a homeowner's
association, of which each buyer of a home within the tract became a mem-
ber and agreed to be bound by the association's declaration. The associa-
tion's declaration contained a number of covenants, restrictions, and
agreements. These terms included an undertaking to pay certain assess-
ments and charges for services, maintenance, and improvements of common
facilities owned by the association. The agreement further provided that
nonpayment of such assessments and charges would give the association a
lien on the property of the delinquent homeowner. Without giving any spe-
cific reason for its conclusions 332 and with two judges dissenting, the court
held that the agreement was binding on the homeowners, who thereby sub-
jected their homesteads to liens for future debts. 333 One might seek to justify
the court's holding as stemming from the proposition that a lien fixed on
homestead property prior to its achieving homestead character continues to
burden the property. Such a lien, however, must secure a present, rather
than a future, indebtedness. The difficulty with the court's conclusion is that
it does not fit established legal concepts. The court appears to have been
325. Id at 736-37.
326. Id. at 735-36.
327. 138 Tex. 56, 59, 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (1941).
328. See Burkhardt v. Lieberman, 138 Tex. 409, 415, 159 S.W.2d 847, 852 (1942); Hughes
v. Wruble, 131 Tex. 444, 448-49, 116 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1938); Texas Land & Loan Co. v.
Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 89, 13 S.W. 12, 13 (1890).
329. Hruska, 727 S.W.2d at 736-37; Lincoln, 138 Tex. at 62, 156 S.W.2d at 507.
330. See supra note 322.
331. 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987).
332. In reversing the decision of the court below, Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Harris, 707 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986), the supreme court merely
cited Johnson v. First Southern Properties, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in Note, Johnson v. First Southern Properties, Inc.: The
Texas Homestead and Condominium Assessments, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 987 (1986).
333. Inwood, 736 S.W.2d at 637.
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simply legislating and, more seriously, legislating to insert a further excep-
tion into the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution.3 34 The Texas
Constitution clearly provides that a person can encumber his or her home-
stead for improvement of the property, provided both spouses agree to such a
lien in writing prior to the commencement of the work. 335 Thus, the consti-
tution allows an agreement for an improvement lien, if made with sufficient
particularity to meet the constitutional requirement. Although the concepts
of maintenance and services related to maintenance are closely related to the
concept of improvement, the Texas Constitution does not allow liens for
maintenance.3 3 6 The appropriate means for amending the Texas Constitu-
tion is to submit such a proposal to the people.
A frequently discussed amendment to the Texas Constitution is a provi-
sion that would allow owners to mortgage their homesteads in order to use
homestead equity as collateral for business loans. 33' In times of business
recession, however, this proposal is mentioned less often because unpaid
mortgages always entail foreclosures. In spite of the lack of such a provision
and the fact that both the lender and borrower know such mortgages are
unenforceable, homeowners often execute sham mortgages on homestead
property so that the homeowner can take advantage of federal income tax
deductions for the interest paid.338 At the legislature's last regular session, a
bill was introduced to give statutory sanction for such "unenforceable deeds
of trust. ' 339 The House passed the proposal, 34° though nothing further
came of it. Ultimately, the legislature enacted a very different bill, declaring
that sham sales of homesteads for less than fair market value with lease-back
of the premises to the seller are invalid. 341
In McSpadden v. Moore 342 the spouses conveyed their home to their son
in 1979 so that he might use it as collateral for a loan that he would negoti-
ate for the benefit of his parents' business. The spouses apparently continued
to live in the home, and the son, with record title to the property reciting an
acquisition for value, negotiated the loan. The spouses later filed for bank-
ruptcy, listing the lender as a creditor in the bankruptcy schedules. The
debtors claimed the property as their homestead, though they did not dis-
close to the court the transfer to the son and his subsequent mortgage of the
property. The son was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. The bank-
ruptcy court held no formal hearing concerning the homestead property,
334. The court did not say that the homeowners' agreement to put future encumbrances on
their homesteads constituted a covenant that ran with the land, however. Such an argument
would have shown not only a misunderstanding of the nature of such covenants, but also a
flagrant disregard for the constitutional inhibition against putting liens on homestead property
except for specified purposes.
335. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
336. Id.
337. The draft constitution rejected by the voters in 1974 contained such a provision. See
J. McKNIGHT & W. REPPY, supra note 133, at 234.
338. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
339. See 39 AUSTIN REPORT, May 17, 1987, at 2.
340. Id.
341. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
342. 728 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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and the opinion does not reveal the court's reasoning nor the procedure fol-
lowed. The son, however, defaulted on the loan, and the lender prepared to
foreclose its lien. At that point the spouses and their son sued to cancel the
spouses' deed to the son and the son's deed to the lender. The petitioners
sought an injunction against foreclosure. The trial court granted summary
judgment for cancellation of the deeds over the lender's objection that a sub-
stantial fact issue was in dispute with respect to the lender's notice of the
validity of the son's title to the property.3 43 The appellate court reversed the
summary judgment, noting that no binding adjudication had been made of
all parties' interests in the bankruptcy proceeding and that a fact issue as to
the lender's notice had been unresolved. 344 Even so, if the lender had no
notice of the simulated quality of the parents' conveyance to their son, the
son's deed of trust to the lender would have been valid, regardless of the
spouses' continued occupancy of the premises as their home.345
Exempt Personalty. As the Attorney General of Texas has pointed out,346
apart from those special provisions found elsewhere in the statutes, section
42.001347 of the Property Code contains an exclusive list of Texas's personal
property exemptions, strictly capped as to value. The legislature signifi-
cantly expanded that catalogue of exemptions in 1987 by adding pension
benefits without limitation as to amount. 348 In interpreting the provisions
enacted in 1973, the Fort Worth court of appeals construed the exemption
for a "camper truck" 349 to include an automobile chassis to which the owner
had welded a unit containing sleeping compartments.350 Citing no author-
ity, the execution creditor asserted that the exemption law is meant to pro-
tect only "utilitarian vehicles" rather than "luxury vehicles."' 35 ' Apart from
the fact that the debtor's vehicle seems to fall clearly within the former
rather than the latter category, the argument contains absolutely no sub-
stance.352 Furthermore, the court pointed out that in order for a claimant of
seized exempt property to put the cost of the storage of the vehicle before the
court, the claimant must fully plead that issue. 353
343. Id. at 441; cf Fuller v. Preston State Bank, 667 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
344. McSpadden, 728 S.W.2d at 442, 443.
345. See Bicocchi v. Casey-Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 264-65, 42 S.W. 963, 965 (1897).
346. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-807 (1987).
347. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984).
348. Id. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1988); see Hall, Retirement Benefits: Texas Property
Code Amendment, 50 TEX. B.J. 993, 994 (1987).
349. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(4)(G) (Vernon 1984).
350. Stephenson v. Wixon, 727 S.W.2d 747, 749-50 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no
writ).
351. Id.
352. This opinion is expressed with full knowledge of the holding in In re Rowe, No. 284-
20097, slip op. at 19-20 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., Mar. 19, 1984), discussed in McKnight, 1986
Annual Survey, supra note 101, at 25, which distinguished ordinary household furnishings
from those acquired as an "investment."
353. Stephenson, 727 S.W.2d at 749-50.
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As is now very apparent, 354 the legislature must amend the provisions of
Texas Property Code section 42.001355 before Texas debtors in bankruptcy
can take advantage of Bankruptcy Code section 522(f). 356 That section,
under certain circumstances, allows a debtor to avoid liens on exempt per-
sonal property. 357 A proposed omnibus revision of chapter 42 of the Prop-
erty Code, which legislators offered for enactment at the 1987 regular
legislative session, would have removed the bar to section 522(f)'s benefits,
but the bill died in the Calendar Committee of the House of Representatives
at the end of the session.
Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code358 allows an individual debtor to
avail himself of either federal law exemptions listed in section 522(d) 359 or
state law exemptions. If a bankrupt chooses federal rather than state exemp-
tions, his asserted exemptions must conform to the definitions in subsections
522(g) and (h) of the Bankruptcy Code. 36° In In re Weaver 361 the court
concluded that, while a television set and a videocassette recorder are
"household goods" within section 522(f), guns and minibikes are not. 362
Although the court was inclined to treat firearms as "household goods" by
applying a Texas standard, the court concluded that Congress had not
meant to include them.363
In In re Poynor364 spouses filed a joint bankruptcy petition and claimed
state exemptions. After the husband died, however, the wife claimed federal
exemptions, rather than those provided by state law, in an effort to secure
the proceeds she received from the insurer of the husband's life on a term
policy. The court held 365 that the wife was precluded from bringing her
claim within subsections 522(d)(7) and (8),366 which deal with interests in
unmatured life insurance contracts. The wife, therefore, was relegated to
claiming the policy proceeds as exempt under section 522(d)(1 1)(C), 367
which limits the protected beneficial interest to an amount "reasonably nec-
essary for [the debtor's] support .... ,368
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Receivership. Although Family Code section 3.58(c) 369 does not define the
354. See Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 1987); Petro
Bank, N.A. v. Graham (In re Graham), 64 Bankr. 469, 472-73 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
355. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a), (c) (Vernon 1984).
356. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
357. Id.
358. Id. § 522(b) (Supp. III 1985).
359. Id. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
360. Id. § 522(g), (h).
361. 78 Bankr. 135 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
362. Id. at 139.
363. Id. at 139 n.6.
364. 68 Bankr. 919 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
365. Id. at 922-23.
366. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7), (8) (1982).
367. Id § 522(d)(11)(C).
368. 68 Bankr. at 922-23.
369. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c) (Vernon 1975).
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grounds that will support the appointment of an interlocutory receiver, the
court in Readhimer v. Readhimer370 held that before the court appoints a
receiver for the marital estate, the petitioner must offer evidence showing
that the appointment is necessary in order to preserve and protect the prop-
erty.371 The court recognized that it was in effect disapproving of some ear-
lier holdings that did not require such a showing to be made.372 The court
went on to note, however, that in any case such an order could not give the
receiver control of land outside the court's jurisdiction.373
In Harmon v. Schoelpple374 the wife petitioned for divorce, joining as a
party a corporation of whose shares a third person owned one-half and
spouses each owned one-quarter. The trial court appointed the wife as re-
ceiver of the corporation but failed to require her to take the appropriate
oath or to make a bond. The third shareholder appealed the appointment of
the receiver. The appellate court held that section 3.58(g) 375 did not pre-
clude the interlocutory appeal. 376 The provision bars only "parties" from
appealing such orders,37 7 and "parties" in that section means "spouses. '378
The court went on to hold that such a receivership is specifically governed
by the provision of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code that precludes a
party to a suit from acting as a receiver. 379 The appointment was also irreg-
ular in that the receiver failed to assume her duties under oath, as required
by statute,380 and failed to give the statutorily required bond.381
In Texas American Bank/West Side v. Haven382 the divorce court ap-
pointed a receiver to sell the couple's home. The receiver sought and ob-
tained a temporary injunction against a mortgagee of the property from
foreclosing its deed of trust. The mortgagee appealed. The appellate court
sustained the injunction, but failed to indicate the standard by which it eval-
uated the trial court's power to enjoin the sale.383 The implication of the
court's decision is that the court can enjoin foreclosure in such instances for
a reasonable time (eight months in this instance) in order to protect the
couple's equity in the house. The house constituted the largest asset of the
community estate. Although the court appointed the receiver a month
before the parties signed the divorce decree, the court granted the injunction
after the signing of the decree. The appellate court nonetheless spoke of the
370. 728 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
371. Id. at 874.
372. Id. at 873 (citing Sparr v. Sparr, 596 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980,
no writ); Jones v. Jones, 211 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, no writ); Hursey v.
Hursey, 147 S.W.2d 1968 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1941, no writ)).
373. Id. at 874.
374. 730 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
375. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(g) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
376. Harmon, 730 S.W.2d at 381.
377. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(g) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
378. Harmon, 730 S.W.2d at 381.
379. Id. at 379; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.021 (Vernon 1986).
380. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.021 (Vernon 1986).
381. Id. § 64.023.
382. 728 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
383. Id. at 103.
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property as being within the trial court's control3 84 and referred to the in-
junction as an interlocutory order. 38 5 What the appellate court probably
meant, however, was that the order was final, but the court maintained con-
tinuing jurisdiction through the device of the receivership.
In another dispute a divorce court instituted a receivership in its final de-
cree for the purpose of liquidating the marital estate. 386 Thereafter, credi-
tors attempted to foreclose a lien on certain property, and third parties
intervened to invalidate the asserted lien. This receivership thus was in no
sense interlocutory, but merely a device that the court used to collect and
liquidate the marital estate and distribute the property in accordance with
the divorce decree. 387 Consequently, although the decree was final, the
court nevertheless maintained its jurisdiction through the means of the
receivership. 38
8
Property Not Subject to Division. Section 3.63 of the Family Code38 9 pro-
vides for the division of "the estate of the parties," and the supreme court
has interpreted that phrase to mean only the spouses' community estate. 39 0
Thus, the division process requires a preliminary characterization of the
spouses' property in order to determine the divisible estate. If, however, the
court mischaracterizes community property as separate property and there-
fore leaves it undivided, the case must be remanded to the trial court for
redivision. 39 1 In Iglinsky v. Iglinsky3 9 2 the divorce court attempted to com-
pute the community interest in two funds by applying the Berry
393
formula, 394 when an exercise in subtraction would have produced the proper
result. The court's miscalculation, therefore, greatly exaggerated the sepa-
rate portion of the fund. Hence, the Beaumont court of appeals required the
trial court to reconsider its division. 395 Similarly, in Marshall v. Marshall 
396
384. Id. at 104-05.
385. Id. at 105.
386. Citizens State Bank v. Caney Invs., 733 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
387. Id. at 586.
388. Id.
389. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
390. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977) (realty); Cameron v. Cam-
eron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tex. 1982) (personalty). For support of the constitutional argu-
ment in Eggemeyer from an unlikely source, see Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 360 Pa. Super. 487,
520 A.2d 1195, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1987).
391. See McKnight, 1987 Annual Survey, supra note 188, at 34; McKnight, 1984 Annual
Survey, supra note 60, at 162.
392. 735 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
393. See Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983), discussed in Brown, An Interdis-
ciplinary Analysis of the Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-Judgment Partition
Actions: Cures for the Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 1131, 1170-97 (1987).
In a habeas corpus case, the court concluded that a party could not plead the Berry formula
defensively in respect of a 1978 final judgment. Ex parte Lucher, 728 S.W.2d 823, 826-27
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987). In Head v. Head, 739 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1987, writ denied), on the other hand, the court rejected a clarification of a 1979 order
because it failed to comply with Berry. Id. at 637.
394. Iglinsky, 735 S.W.2d at 537.
395. Id. at 539.
396. 735 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the Dallas court of appeals remanded the case because the trial court mis-
characterized assets and liabilities as having a separate character and thereby
skewed the division.3 97 In Castle v. Castle398 the trial court had awarded
separate property of one spouse to the other spouse as a result of mis-
characterization. Although the trial court's exercise of discretion was only
indirectly at issue, the appellate court compounded the error by reforming
the judgment, rather than remanding the case to the trial court. 399
In Marshall the trial court also mischaracterized household furnishings as
community property. The furnishings either belonged to a partnership of
which the husband was a member or, as a result of the partnership's distri-
bution of the furnishings to the spouses, were the separate property of each
spouse in equal shares. 4°° In Rathmell v. Morrison,4° 1 on the other hand, the
shares of stock in corporate entities were community assets and therefore
subject to division. In valuing those shares, however, the court impermissi-
bly included business goodwill attributable to the personality of the husband,
who was a key employee of the corporations. 4°2 Thus, not only mis-
characterization of assets but misvaluation of assets may require remand to
the trial court for a redivision of the property.
Retirement Benefits. In recent months the number of reported cases dealing
with disputes concerning federal retirement benefits of a spouse divorced
prior to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo403 and McCarty v. McCarty4° 4 seems to have abated somewhat.
Thus, the consequences of those unfortunate rulings and the congressional
reactions to them may have almost run their course.405
In two instances Texas spouses asserted constitutional attacks against the
validity of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
of 1982 (USFSPA).4° 6 In Brannon v. Randmaa4°7 a 1977 Texas divorce
decree had failed to dispose of the future military retirement benefits of the
husband. The ex-wife brought a suit for the right to entitlement to future
benefits. The husband-serviceman argued that because he had served in the
Air Force from 1964 until 1984, he had a vested right of sole enjoyment of
the military pension rights pursuant to McCarty.4° 8 The USFSPA, the hus-
397. Id. at 594-95, 597, 600.
398. 734 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
399. Id. at 414.
400. Marshall, 735 S.W.2d at 597-98, 600.
401. 732 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
402. Id. at 17-18.
403. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). In Exparte Lucher, 728 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987), the court refused to apply the decision in Hisquierdo to a decree of divorce that
had theretofore become final. Id. at 825.
404. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
405. For a brief summary of these developments and their resolution, see Campbell & Mc-
Kelvey, Partitioning Military Retirement Benefits: Mapping the Post-McCarty Jungle, 49 TEX.
B.J. 970, 971-74 (1986).
406. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West Supp. 1988).
407. 736 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
408. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 225-26 (1981).
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band argued, could not abrogate that right.409 The court found no need to
respond to the pensioner's constitutional argument because past acquisitions
under the congressional pension scheme were not in issue. 410 In effect, the
Austin court of appeals held that the husband had not acquired a vested
right to receive benefits as his own, but rather as an entitlement that Con-
gress might redefine from time to time.411
In Goad v. United States412 a serviceman divorced in Texas in 1980 chal-
lenged the USFSPA's authority to require withholding of the portion of his
retirement pay awarded to his ex-wife. The serviceman had refused to pay
the amount ordered by the court, and in 1985 the ex-wife applied for with-
holding of funds and payment to her pursuant to the USFSPA.413 After
proper notice to the ex-serviceman and an administrative determination that
his objections to withholding were unfounded, the federal finance center be-
gan withholding the husband's pension payments in favor of the ex-wife.
The ex-husband brought suit in federal court,41 4 asserting that the McCarty
case invalidated part of the divorce court's order. The district court reiter-
ated the proposition that McCarty had no effect on the prior state-court de-
cree415 and that the USFSPA did not, therefore, resuscitate that decree. 416
Responding to the ex-serviceman's argument that the USFSPA unconstitu-
tionally delegated federal legislative power to the states, the court noted that
the ex-husband had standing to attack the USFSPA only insofar as it sanc-
tioned withholding of the ex-wife's share of retired pay as determined by the
divorce court.417 In addition to pointing out that the ex-husband's assertion
lacked substantive merit, the court commented that the state court's decree
had always remained valid and that the ex-husband could not complain of
the federal act's implementation of the decree. 418
In Goad the court also addressed the ex-husband's argument that with-
409. The pensioner relied principally on Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bellmont Bridge Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), in which the Supreme Court held that a subsequent act of
Congress could not undo the Court's prior adjudication, id. at 436.
410. Brannon, 736 S.W.2d at 176-77.
411. Id. at 177-79.
412. 661 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
413. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d) (West Supp. 1988).
414. Because the ex-serviceman sought monetary recovery in an amount exceeding
$10,000, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over that remedy. Graham v. Hene-
gar, 640 F.2d 732, 723-35 (5th Cir. 1981). The district court, however, declined to transfer the
action to the Court of Claims because the United States could not be held liable for making
payments under the USFSPA pursuant to a state court order that was regular on its face.
Goad, 661 F. Supp. at 1077. The district court, therefore, proceeded to adjudicate the ex-
husband's petition for declaratory relief involving questions over which the court had jurisdic-
tion. Id.
415. Goad, 661 F. Supp. at 1079-80. A Texas appellate court reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the effect of the decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), on a
prior Texas divorce decree dividing Railroad Retirement Act benefits. Ex parte Lucher, 728
S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987).
416. Goad, 661 F. Supp. at 1079-80 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 497, 499 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Brown v. Robertson, 606 F. Supp. 494, 496 (W.D. Tex.
1985); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983)).
417. Id. at 1080.
418. Id. For what the court deemed a "patently frivolous" action the court imposed mone-
tary sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 on the ex-husband, who appeared pro se. Id. at 1080-
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holding his retirement pay amounted to garnishment of wages and was
therefore contrary to the Texas Constitution.4 19 In rejecting this argument,
the court pointed out that Texas authorities have uniformly held that mili-
tary retirement pay is not properly classified as current wages not subject to
garnishment.4 20 Even if the ex-husband's share of the retired pay were his
wages, the portion awarded to his ex-wife are her wages and the antigarnish-
ment defense is irrelevant. 42 1
In another case422 an ex-wife of a prospective pensioner under the Texas
Teacher's Retirement Act 423 sought to use a writ of garnishment to reach an
interest in her former husband's pension plan that the divorce court had
awarded to her as her share of community property. Under the statute,
however, such interests are not subject to withdrawal on behalf of the pen-
sioner until death, retirement, or termination of employment. 424 Hence, the
same restraints apply to the pensioner's ex-wife.4 25 These consequences
merely result from the ex-husband's employment contract and handling of
his wages, of which he is the sole manager by operation of law.426
Making the Division. In making the division of the community estate that is
"just and right, '427 the divorce court has broad discretion in achieving the
partition of assets and in ordering one or the other spouse to pay debts for
which both spouses may be liable to a creditor. 428 The Texas Supreme
Court has provided a catalogue of criteria and standards to guide trial courts
in these circumstances. 429 An appellate court will not disturb the trial
court's exercise of its power unless the appellant shows a clear abuse of dis-
82. For an earlier bout in the same controversy see Ex parte Goad, 690 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.
1985), discussed in McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 101, at 45.
419. Goad, 661 F. Supp. at 1080; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon 1986).
420. See Goad, 661 F. Supp. at 1078 and Texas authorities cited therein.
421. See Chandler v. Chandler (In re Chandler), 805 F.2d 555, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1986).
422. Dyer v. Investors Life Ins. Co., 728 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
423. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 110B, ch. 36 (Vernon Pam. 1987).
424. Id. § 31.005.
425. 728 S.W.2d at 479; see Dyer, 728 S.W.2d at 480.
426. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975); see Valdez v. Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d
748, 750-51 (Tex. 1978).
427. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975). Section 3.63 is not unconstitutionally
vague. Oliver v. Oliver, 741 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
428. See Coggin v. Coggin, 738 S.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no
writ); Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in State Court Divorce Proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955,
979-84 (1987). Dividing a community interest in a business entity involves unique considera-
tions. See Note, Proving the Value of Goodwill of a Spouse's Closely-Held Commercial Corpo-
ration in a Divorce Proceeding, 25 J. FAM. L. 549, 553-57 (1987); Annotation, Divorce:
Propriety of Property Distribution Leaving Both Parties With Substantial Ownership Interest in
Same Business, 56 A.L.R.4th 862, 869-75 (1987). Related problems include the characteriza-
tion and divisibility of intangible assets such as copyrights and professional degrees. See In re
Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136-38 (Ct. App. 1987); VALUING PROFES-
SIONAL PRACTICES AND LICENSES: A GUIDE FOR THE MATRIMONIAL PRACTITIONER 109-
208 (R. Brown ed. 1987); Abrams, Equitable Distribution: Dividing Professional Status, 92
CASE & COM. 2, 6 (1987); Shelburn & Chastain, Career Assets and the Equitable Apportion-
ment of Marital Property, 38 S.C. L. REV. 755, 759-62 (1987).
429. Murif v. Murif, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); see Coggin v. Coggin, 738 S.W.2d
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cretion.430 When the divorce court does not file findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law, an appellate court will affirm the judgment of the trial court on
the basis of any facts in the record that support the divorce court's conclu-
sions.431 If, however, a party made a timely request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the trial court failed to prepare them, the appellate
court must reverse the judgment unless the record shows affirmatively that
no prejudice resulted from the trial court's failure to act.432 In this and
other situations, a party nevertheless may be estopped from making an ap-
pellate challenge to the trial court's order if he or she has taken the benefits
of the judgment by disposal of assets awarded, unless under compulsion of
necessity to do so. 433
Attorney's Fees. In Carle v. Carle434 the Supreme Court of Texas stated that
the award of attorney's fees is but one element in the trial court's exercise of
its discretion in making a division of the community estate.435 One must
bear in mind, however, that at the time the court decided Carle, in 1950, a
married woman lacked a general power to contract with an attorney or any-
one else.436 The agency principle of necessity, therefore, governed the valid-
ity of the wife's contracts, and the agreed amount in such cases was subject
to a test of reasonableness. 437 Thus, even if the parties did not plead the
necessaries doctrine, they nevertheless tried the case with a tacit understand-
ing of the principle. Because of the wife's lack of capacity to contract, the
court in Carle was therefore addressing the amount that the husband might
be ordered to pay or the manner of payment. Since 1963, a Texas married
woman has had full power to contract, 438 and the doctrine of necessaries,
though specifically referred to in the Family Code,439 is rarely pled and
seems to be disappearing from the general consciousness of the bench and
bar. 4 0 Thus, if the parties do not affirmatively plead the doctrine of neces-
375, 376 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Koons & Holmes, Division of Property at
Divorce, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 977, 1018-26 (1987).
430. In the great majority of cases in which the exercise of the trial court's discretion is
questioned, the court's division is affirmed. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 741 S.W.2d 225, 228-29
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Coggin v. Coggin, 738 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Castle v. Castle, 734 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no writ); Simpson v. Simpson, 727 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987,
no writ); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 722 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no
writ); Annotation, Divorce: Excessiveness or Adequacy of Trial Court's Property A ward-Mod-
ern Cases, 56 A.L.R.4th 12, 19-20 (1987).
431. Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986).
432. Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no
writ); see Castle v. Castle, 734 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
433. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950); see Morgan v. Mor-
gan, 725 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
434. 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950).
435. Id. at 474, 234 S.W.2d at 1005.
436. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
437. Carle, 149 Tex. at 472, 234 S.W.2d at 1004.
438. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 472, § 6, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1188, 1189 (codified at TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (Vernon 1975)).
439. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 4.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1988).
440. An occasional aberrant judicial comment occurs with respect to liability for attorney's
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saries today and the court does not order either spouse to pay all or part of
the other spouse's attorney's fees as part of the division, each attorney is left
to pursue his or her contractual or quasi-contractual remedies in a separate
suit. The Dallas court of appeals, however, has recently interpreted the
Carle decision to mean that a divorce court's award is the exclusive means of
recovering attorney's fees from an opposing party."' Thus, in that court's
view, if the attorney does not pursue those attorney's fees recoverable against
the opposing party in the suit for divorce, the attorney is barred from later
suit on the matter." 2 For a divorce court to sever the question of attorney's
fees for a separate trial, therefore, is clearly improper." 3 The Fort Worth
court of appeals expressed a diametrically opposite view in Petrovich v. Vau-
train.44" In Petrovich the court sustained the trial court's severance of an
attorney's claim against both spouses for attorney's fees on the ground that
the attorney can always maintain a separate suit in that regard. 4 4 5
Without citing the extremely dubious conclusion of the Texarkana court
of appeals to the same effect,446 the San Antonio court of appeals concluded
that a spouse's failure to assert and prove his homestead claim in a divorce
case permits the court to order that the homestead be sold for purposes of
division and that attorney's fees be paid from the proceeds of the sale.4 4 7
The conclusion is questionable on grounds both of policy and precedent.
Undivided Property. Frequently, as a result of oversight, concealment by one
of the spouses, or a carelessly drawn judgment, the divorce court leaves some
of the community estate of the spouses undivided. Interests in insurance
policies and retirement benefits are among the types of property most com-
monly overlooked. After divorce, as a matter of law, the undivided commu-
nity becomes a tenancy in common of the former spouses.4 4 8 Under this
rule, authoritatively enunciated in Busby v. Busby,44 9 the parties have undi-
vided, equal interests in separate property.4 50
While courts frequently overlook life insurance policies when making a
property division, even when the divorce court deals with the ownership of a
policy, further problems emerge when the recipient fails to designate a new
beneficiary. The most common situation has been that of the insured who
fees, which may stem from a hazy recollection of the necessaries doctrine. See Wileman v.
Wade, 665 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ), discussed in McKnight, 1985
Annual Survey, supra note 238, at 15.
441. John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur, 700 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no
writ).
442. Id.
443. Inman v. O'Donnell, 722 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
444. 730 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
445. Id. at 861 (citing Gunther v. Gunther, 301 S.W.2d 207, 208-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1957, writ dism'd); Roberts v. Roberts, 193 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1945, no writ)).
446. Smith v. Smith, 715 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ), dis-
cussed in McKnight, 1987 Annual Surey, supra note 188, at 24-25.
447. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 722 S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
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failed to replace his former spouse as designated beneficiary. In the past
courts most commonly solved this problem in one of two ways. One line of
cases broadly construed the divorce decree to give the ownership of the pol-
icy to the insured and to terminate the beneficial interest of the other
spouse.451 The second approach narrowly construed the decree, thereby
leaving the beneficiary designation undisturbed with the result that the
owner of the policy was presumed to maintain the designation unless he
changed it.4 52 In Novotny v. Wittner453 the court followed the broad ap-
proach.454 In Nichols v. Nichols,455 however, the language of the decree ex-
acerbated the problem. The court's judgment awarded the insured the cash
surrender value of the policy but said nothing of the beneficial interest of the
ex-wife. The insured failed to change the beneficial interest of the ex-wife,
though he made inconclusive efforts to do so in compliance with the terms of
the policy. After a jury trial to determine the beneficiary of the deceased
insured, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the ex-wife, and the
Beaumont court of appeals affirmed the judgment.456 The court thus arrived
at a narrow interpretation of the decree.
To dispose of these disparities of approach, at its last regular session the
legislature laid down statutory rules to cover the most common problems
affecting undivided interests in insurance contracts. Following the pattern
set forth by section 69 of the Probate Code,457 Family Code subsections
3.632(a) and (b)458 provide that after a divorce or annulment, a beneficiary
designation of a life insurance policy in favor of the former spouse of the
insured is ineffective unless the divorce decree keeps the designation in effect
or the insured redesignates the former spouse as beneficiary. These subsec-
tions presuppose that the divorce court awards the policy to the insured or
leaves the ownership of the policy undivided. If the court awards the policy
to the ex-spouse of the insured, a new designation is presumably unneces-
sary.459 The legislature also provided correlative rules for insurance policies
other than those insuring life.46° The legislature also enacted a new section
3.633461 to provide that a divorce or annulment similarly effects the benefi-
451. See McDonald v. McDonald, 632 S.W.2d 636, 638-39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Beckham v. Beckham, 672 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
no writ). In both of these instances, however, the insured died almost immediately after the
divorce, and that fact may have influenced the courts' analysis.
452. See Lewis v. Lewis, 693 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ);
Parker v. Parker, 683 S.W.2d 889, 890-91 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd).
453. 731 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
454. Id. at 105.
455. 727 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
456. Id. at 307.
457. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1980).
458. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.632(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (effective November 1,
1987).
459. Family Code § 3.632(b)(1) should be amended to cover this eventuality.
460. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.632(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
461. Id. § 3.633. This section does not apply to benefits of the Texas public retirement
system as provided in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. l0B, § 12.001 (Vernon Pam. 1988).
In Savings & Profit Sharing Fund v. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
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cial interests of a former spouse in retirement benefits and other financial
plans of an employee.
Dearman v. Dutschmann462 dealt with a different type of life insurance
problem. In Dearman the divorce decree did not dispose of the community
policy, and the insured husband changed the beneficiary from the ex-wife to
his mother after the divorce. On appeal, because the policy became a ten-
ancy in common between the former spouses by operation of law, the appel-
late court found error in the trial court's summary judgment for the named
beneficiary and remanded the cause.463 The terms of section 3.632, however,
do not affect this sort of situation.
Many questions have arisen as to whether particular assets are divided
effectively by decrees whose terms do not make specific disposition of those
assets and whose general terms may or may not include them. If, for exam-
ple, a decree does not mention retirement benefits specifically and the judg-
ment contains no general residuary clause that might include such interests,
the decree does not dispose of the retirement benefits. Although in Brannon
v. Randmaa464 the parties' property settlement agreement (incorporated in
the decree) stated that they "divided their real and personal property," the
agreement did not specifically deal with community retirement benefits, and
the benefits therefore became a tenancy in common between the ex-
spouses.465 The decree in Dearman v. Dutschmann,466 which merely dis-
posed of "personal effects," was, by a similar analysis, ineffective to dispose
of intangible contract rights.467
If a litigant alleges that a foreign court left community property undivided
and does not prove the foreign law or submit pleadings sufficient to allow the
Texas court to take judicial notice of the foreign law, the Texas court must
presume that the applicable foreign law is the same as Texas law.468 Hence,
in such circumstances when a California court did not divide community
pension benefits, a Texas court applied Texas law to determine whether the
California judgment left the property undivided. 469 In this instance the de-
cree had failed to mention military retirement benefits (neither accrued nor
vested at divorce) specifically, although the parties' property settlement
agreement incorporated in the decree stated that the parties "desire ... to
... settle between them all questions concerning their community and other
property rights."'470 This intention did not suffice, however, to divide the
writ), the dispute with respect to the proper beneficiary of an employee benefit plan centered
on the entitlement of the trusts and the surviving widow to attorney's fees.
462. 739 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
463. Id. at 456.
464. 736 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
465. Id. at 176.
466. 739 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
467. Id. at 455-56.
468. Ewing v. Ewing, 739 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
469. Id. at 472-73. Under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.9 1(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988) the court
"shall apply" the foreign law "regarding undivided property."
470. Dearman, 739 S.W.2d at 471.
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unmentioned retirement benefits.47 1 The clause releasing each party from
future claims of the other party was also ineffective for that purpose.472 The
provisions that divided community property in the possession of a spouse
also could not transfer an intangible interest.473 Finally, because the retire-
ment benefits constituted a contingent interest in property acquired during
marriage, the benefits were not covered by an after-acquired property clause
by which such property belonged to the acquiring ex-spouse. 474
In a 1982 divorce the wife in Koepke v. Koepke 475 sought a division of
various types of community property and one-half of the husband's military
retirement benefits. The court's judgment divided certain enumerated items
but did not specifically include the retirement benefits. The decree closed
with the words "[a]ll relief requested in this case and not expressly granted
herein be and is hereby denied. '476 The Texas Supreme Court held that in
using this language the trial court was merely following a precedential form
to make the decree final and not interlocutory in effect; 477 hence, the decree
did not dispose of the military retirement benefits that were subject to subse-
quent partition. 47 8
One of the difficulties with the conclusion in Busby is that it has never
really meshed with the various authorities that hold that a divorce court
must divide all community property or else its decree is interlocutory, not
final.479 In order to reconcile these authorities with the Busby holding, one
might say that division of all community property means that the court must
divide all community property known to the court in order to assure finality
of the judgment. This rule does not explain the result in Koepke, however.
In Koepke the court knew of the retirement benefits, as the benefits were
before the court for division. 480 Thus, in light of Koepke, a divorce decree is
final if the court did not intentionally omit assets from the division.
An odd result of the rule in Busby 4 8 1 is that the undivided community
property that becomes a tenancy in common is thereafter subject to equal
partition, rather than the "just and right" division that would have occurred
had the divorce court divided the property.482 A legislative act in 1987483
partially changed that result. That is, a court to which either ex-spouse may
471. Id. at 473.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 472-73.
475. 732 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1987).
476. Id. at 300.
477. Id.; see Northeast Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. 1966).
478. 732 S.W.2d at 300. The Texas Supreme Court stated: "Omission of certain commu-
nity property from a divorce decree does not affect its finality. If it did, we would have no need
for the rule that community property which is not divided on divorce is held by the former
spouses as tenants in common." Id. The logic of the court's point is not readily apparent.
479. For a discussion of these authorities, see McKnight, supra note 101, at 38; McKnight,
1984 Annual Survey, supra note 60, at 162.
480. Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1987).
481. See supra notes 448-50 and accompanying text.
482. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.91-.92 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
483. Id. §§ 3.90-.93.
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present the issue of dividing undivided former community property will use
the "just and right" standard for its disposition.484 The claimant for such a
division must bring the suit within two years after discovering that the other
ex-spouse has unequivocally repudiated the claimant's interest. 485 But if one
of the parties to the divorce or annulment dies before any proceeding for
division is brought or fails to bring suit within two years of the discovery of
unequivocal repudiation, the parties would still hold the property as tenants
in common. 48 6 Thus, part of the Busby rule still subsists.
To outside observers the greater oddity of the Busby rule may be that the
divorce decree is not res judicata, leaving to each former spouse all property
that he or she nominally holds or actually controls and that might have been
put before the court for division. Three of the dissenting judges in Busby
preferred this result.4 8 7 The majority of the court presumably steered away
from that conclusion because such a rule would have encouraged secreting
of assets on divorce and would have overemphasized nominal title-holding,
contrary to Texas usage.
Property Settlement Agreements. In the case of terms of agreed judgments or
those of property settlement agreements incorporated in judicial decrees, the
Supreme Court of Texas has employed the rules of contract law, rather than
those of judgments in determining the meaning of ambiguous provisions.48 8
The contract law rule is functionally preferable to the judgments rule be-
cause it admits evidence concerning the parties' intent and surrounding cir-
cumstances to ascertain the significance of ambiguous terms used. 489 Under
the law of judgments, courts look only to the terms of the decree.490 In
practice, however, most appellate courts seldom rely on any source other
than the terms of the decree.
In Smith v. Smith 491 the residuary clause of the spouses' settlement agree-
ment provided that each spouse would retain the personal property in his or
her possession. The majority of the court seemed to conclude that, as a mat-
ter of law, the reference to property in possession in such clauses means
"physical control of property" and therefore does not include retirement
benefits. 492 Justice Dunn, in dissent, attempted to approach the problem in
484. Id. §§ 3.91-.92.
485. Id. § 3.90(c).
486. Id.; see supra notes 448-50 and accompanying text.
487. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970) (Walker, J., joined by Greenhill and
McGee, JJ., dissenting).
488. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984); see McKnight, 1986 An-
nual Survey, supra note 101, at 28-29.
489. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981).
490. Austin v. Conaway, 283 S.W. 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, no writ).
491. 733 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
492. Id. at 916-17. In most of the Texas appellate cases on this point the courts have
reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ewing, 739 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Dunn v. Dunn, 703 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Carreon v. Morales, 698 S.W.2d 241, 244-45 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1985, no writ).
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terms of contractual interpretation to reach a contrary result, but her efforts
were hindered by having nothing more than the written terms of the agree-
ment for guidance. 493 That one approach is any more contractually oriented
than the other approach is difficult to see. The members of the court seemed
to disagree merely on the construction of the language of the decree.
The difference between applying the rules for construing contracts and
those for interpreting judgments is also not very apparent in another context.
In Fox v. Fox494 the dispute centered on whether the reference to Texaco
stock in the nonconsensual decree referred only to the Texaco stock held in
the name of the husband or whether it also included stock held in the hus-
band's benefit-plan. The Beaumont court of appeals held that the decretal
reference to "the Texaco stock," which divested the husband of "all right,
title and interest in and to . . . the Texaco stock," disposed of all Texaco
stock that the parties held in their own names or in trust.495 Because the
judgment was noncontractual, the court could not consider evidence of the
parties' intent.496 While this part of the decision is clear, just why a decretal
reference to "the Texaco stock" must therefore include Texaco stock held in
trust is hard to understand.
In conformity with the principles of contractual interpretation, property
settlement agreements incorporated in divorce decrees are subject to refor-
mation for mutual mistake.497 An ex-spouse can also obtain reformation
with respect to omitted property in order to conform an agreement to the
parties' evidenced intentions.498 But, as illustrated by Templet v. Tem-
plet,499 if the ex-spouse seeks mere clarification rather than reformation, and
the trial court's decree, albeit an agreed judgment, is silent with respect to
disposition of particular property, the court cannot grant relief.50° In Tem-
plet the spouses' agreed judgment did not dispose of the family home, but
merely provided for occupancy. Hence, the property was undisposed and
was not subject to an order for clarification. 50 1 If the ex-husband had sought
reformation and had adduced evidence with respect to the parties' agree-
ment or mutual intention, the court could have granted relief.502
Clarification. The interpretative process instituted by a motion to clarify a
divorce decree requires that the court elucidate, but not change, the prior
order. If in the course of clarifying the order the court makes an error of
493. Smith, 733 S.W.2d at 918-20 (Dunn, J., dissenting).
494. 720 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
495. Id. at 882.
496. Id.
497. Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1986), discussed in McKnight, 1987Annual
Survey, supra note 188, at 29-30; Markantonis v. Tripoli, 730 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
498. Patrick v. Patrick, 728 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
499. 728 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
500. Id. at 847-48.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 848.
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law, the clarification order cannot stand and must be set aside on appeal. 503
If a court cannot clarify the original order because of omissions, the rule of
undivided property or res judicata applies, depending on the circumstances.
In Able v. Able 5 4 the divorce court had specifically divided prepaid income
taxes for the year of divorce. Further along in the decree, the court ordered
that the husband pay "all other community liability of any nature not specif-
ically ordered to be paid" by the wife. 50 5 The ex-wife sought a determina-
tion that the ex-husband pay all the taxes incurred during the marriage. The
ex-husband asserted, in effect, that the specific order for division of prepaid
taxes implied that the other more general provision of the decree was not
meant to deal with tax liability. Thus, the ex-husband argued, the liability
clause of the decree was not meant to cover liability for taxes. The court
rejected this argument by saying that the division of assets did not preclude
the trial court from ordering the discharge of liabilities.50 6 While courts
have often construed orders to pay "community debts" as not including the
duty to discharge federal income tax liability,50 7 the court in Able considered
the liability clause in this instance sufficiently broad to encompass liability
for federal taxes. 508
In Stanley v. Stanley 509 the wife sought clarification of a divorce judgment
awarding her one-half of "any damages recovered by [her husband] for loss
of earning capacity during the marriage," for which his suit was pending
when the divorce court entered the decree.510 The ex-husband later settled
his suit, and the ex-wife received payment from the tortfeasors for loss of
consortium and one-half of the husband's lost earning capacity during mar-
riage. The ex-wife contended that although she had received payment from
the tortfeasors, she had not been paid by her ex-husband in accordance with
the divorce decree. The trial court found that she had already recovered
that to which she was entitled under the divorce decree, and the appellate
court found no agreement between the parties or other facts in the record to
disturb the lower court's determination.51' In effect, receipt of payment
from the tortfeasor amounted to payment by the ex-husband under the di-
vorce decree. 512
Enforcement. Under the 1983 provisions of the Family Code for enforce-
503. Head v. Head, 739 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
504. 725 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
505. Id. at 780.
506. Id. at 779.
507. See Moody v. Moody, 154 Tex. 114, 117-18, 274 S.W.2d 535, 536-37 (1955); Brooks v.
Brooks, 515 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gaulding v.
Gaulding, 256 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ).
508. Able, 725 S.W.2d at 780.
509. 725 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
510. Id. at 442.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 442-43. The appellate court also noted that the ex-wife had unsuccessfully
sought relief from a federal court. Id. at 443. Although the judgment of that court and its
affirmation by the Fifth Circuit court were not free from ambiguity, the Texas appellate court
held that the matter before it was res judicata. Id. at 443.
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ment of divorce decrees,513 enforcement suits are to be brought in the di-
vorce court.514 A party must bring a motion to enforce a division of tangible
personal property within two years of the time that the decree is signed or
becomes final after appeal. 515 The Waco court of appeals has held, however,
that if the court, on its own motion, orders delivery of such personal prop-
erty beyond the two-year time limitation, such an order is proper although
an aggrieved party could not have invoked the court's power.516
In Bowden v. Knowlton 5 1 7 the ex-wife brought suit for money due under a
divorce decree. The trial court had concluded that the two-year statute of
limitation in Family Code section 3.70(c) 518 barred the suit.5 19 In the di-
vorce decree the court awarded the wife $10,000 in lieu of her interest in the
family home and in the husband's retirement benefits, both of which the
court awarded to the husband. The decree further provided that the amount
was due within thirty-one days of "finality" of the judgment. 520 A year later
the ex-husband paid the ex-wife $5,000, and the ex-spouses agreed in writing
that he should pay her the remaining $5,000 when he sold the house. Hence,
the ex-wife was still entitled to $5,000 under the divorce decree. Her objec-
tive was to reduce that claim to judgment. The part of the subsection deal-
ing with enforcement of divisions of tangible personal property clearly did
not apply, as the appellate court pointed out.521 Whether section 3.70(c),522
which provides a period of two years for filing a motion to enforce the divi-
sion of future property not in existence at the time of the divorce decree, was
meant to apply to these facts is unclear. The statute of limitation, however,
clearly had not run. The appellate court further pointed out that the ex-wife
was entitled to judgment under section 3.74(b),523 though the trial court
could consider the agreement to extend time for payment in fashioning the
plaintiff's relief.524 In remanding the case to the trial court, the appellate
513. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
514. Id. § 3.70. A suit filed before that statute became effective, however, could have been
brought in another court. Blake v. Blake, 725 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
515. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The property that is the ob-ject of the decree must have existed at the time of the divorce. Id. For a discussion of the
length of time applicable for filing of claims arising before the effective date of the 1983 statute,
see Gonzales v. Gonzales, 728 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
By way of obiter dicta, the court in Bowden v. Knowlton, 734 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), discussed the application of this provision to a hypothetical
division of tangible personal property in light of the peculiar terms of the decree in that case.
Id. at 207-08.
516. Burton v. Burton, 734 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ). In this
instance the ex-wife filed a motion for child support. The ex-husband responded with a motion
for contempt for failure to deliver tangible personal property in existence at the time of di-
vorce. This motion drew the court's attention to the ex-husband's grievance.
517. 734 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
518. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
519. Bowden, 734 S.W.2d at 207.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
523. Id. § 3.74(b). Section 3.74 does not mention a period of limitation.
524. Bowden, 734 S.W.2d at 208.
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court went on to say that in aid of enforcement of the monetary award, the
trial court might impose a lien on the home 525 under the rule in McGoodwin
v. McGoodwin.526
Overruling the conclusion of the Austin court of appeals, 527 the Texas
Supreme Court in Stubbe v. Stubbe 528 held that a party may enforce a past-
due judgment against the United States in order to reach an ex-spouse's mili-
tary retirement pay.529 The recipient of contractual support may take ad-
vantage of the federal government's waiver of immunity to garnishment for
alimony. 30
In Veterans Administration v. Kee,531 however, the Texas Supreme Court
reiterated its holding in Ex parte Johnson 532 that federal military disability
benefits are not subject to garnishmpnt.5 33 In this instance an ex-wife sought
to enforce a foreign judgment for alimony and child support against Veter-
ans Administration disability benefits, which the serviceman received as a
consequence of waiving all of his military retirement benefits. Although the
federal statute speaks in terms of the pensioner's waiving "a portion" of his
military retirement benefits in order to receive disability benefits adminis-
tered by the Veterans Administration, 534 the court treated his waiver of all
of his retirement benefits as amounting to compliance with the statute.535
This conclusion is consistent with the federal regulations. 536
In Lee v. State 537 Texas brought a criminal proceeding for violation of a
court order against an ex-husband who contravened the parties' agreement
that the ex-husband would not to go within 200 yards of his ex-wife's resi-
dence. 538 The court's order evidently incorporated the agreement, but did
not contain an order to the ex-husband in respect of the agreement. The
appellate court held that without a court order that would support a con-
525. Id. at 208-09.
526. 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984).
527. Stubbe v. Stubbe, 710 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986) (per curiam); see
McKnight, supra note 188, at 33 (criticizing Stubbe along the lines followed by the supreme
court).
528. 733 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1987).
529. Id. at 133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1988) enforces a past-due
judgment that has arisen under a divorce decree, which incorporates a contractual alimony
agreement.
530. Stubbe, 733 S.W.2d at 133; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 659, 663(c) (1983). The contractual sup-
port provision is binding under Texas law. Stubbe, 733 S.W.2d at 133.
531. 706 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1986).
532. 591 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1979).
533. Kee, 706 S.W.2d at 103; Johnson, 591 S.W.2d at 456.
534. See 42 U.S.C. § 662(f)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
535. Kee, 706 S.W.2d at 102-03.
536. Id. at 103.
537. 742 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
538. The prosecution was brought under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (Vernon Supp.
1987):
(a) A person commits an offense if, in violation of an order issued under Sec-
tion 3.581, Section 71.11, or Section 71.12, Family Code, he knowingly or
intentionally:
(3) goes to or near the residence ... of a member of the family or household as
specifically described in the protective order ....
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tempt order, the ex-husband had not committed a criminal act within the
penal statute. 539
Effect of Bankruptcy. Prior to their divorce the husband and wife in Roberts
v. Poole 540 entered into a property settlement agreement by which the hus-
band agreed to make monthly payments to support his wife. Several years
later, the ex-husband filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy court admitted parol evidence to show that the support payments
actually amounted to a division of the spouses' community estate. On ap-
peal the district court followed In re Benich 541 in holding that the evidence
was admissible to show the true nature of the debt. 542 Although provisions
of the property settlement agreement unambiguously stated that the
monthly payments were for support of the ex-wife, parol evidence showed
that the provision was for division of property, and the debt was therefore
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 543
539. 742 S.W.2d at 82; see Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. 1987) (lack of
notice of court order as grounds for granting writ of habeas corpus).
540. 80 Bankr. 81 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
541. 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987).
542. Roberts, 80 Bankr. at 86.
543. Id. For a thorough analysis of this subject, see Comment, Bankruptcy Discharge of
Texas Marital Property A wards under Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code: Rethinking In
re Nunnally, 41 Sw. L.J. 869, 878-84 (1987).
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